Donald Trump: A Symptom of Imperial Decline

                                         

 Thirty-six years ago the political scientist Robert Gilpin wrote Hegemonic War and International Change, a seminal piece that is still required reading for many undergraduates (including my own). He identifies discernable patterns throughout the history of global politics, namely, power transitions from the established but declining great power to the rising one. The characteristics of the declining state’s politics include anger about the loss of status, disputes about the reasons for its occurrence, increased political polarization, insularity, and pessimism—a mix of conditions that are ripe for the rise of a strong man who promises to make things right. In this blog post I will suggest that this pattern fits the current global order characterized with America’s relative decline and Chinese ascendency, and that Donald Trump’s triumph is not unrelated to this historical power transition.

The main contenders

Gilpin shows that as the leading state declines, more and more believe that its international commitments are too costly to sustain, mainly because of the needs of domestic constituents.  There are several ways of responding to this challenge: scale back the commitments, demand that the recipients pay more for the costs of protection, or increase domestic productivity so that more resources are available for funding international obligations. Generally, the last is hardest because the established power’s population is aging and lacks the dynamism for the necessary increase in growth, or it has lost the desire to bear the burden of leadership. The first two, therefore, are typically pursued.

Another aspect of power transitions is a “closing of space”: the established and rising powers repeatedly “bump” into each other, leading to minor skirmishes. Alliance formations are a major reason for these disputes, as a distinguishing feature of the established power is defense and economic ties to countries that feel threatened by the rising one (sometimes called “encirclement”). These ties help balance the rising power, but only up to a point. When allies begin to feel that the hegemon’s commitments to their security are not secure, they either beef up their own defense capabilities, consider developing new security arrangements or defect to the rising power.

Lastly, Gilpin shows that the society of the declining power is characterized with an increased rights-based mentality that emphasizes individual (and hence domestic) needs and wants over international ones. There are also major domestic disputes about which rights should be satisfied, leading to fierce political conflict that becomes difficult to bridge. As polarization increases, a blame game ensues as each side of the political divide blames the other for the general decline in economic well-being. Conversely, in the rising state a sense of duty to contribute to the nation’s destiny prevails. There is a relatively accepted consensus that it will soon assume leadership of the international system and that citizens, in both public and private sectors, should contribute to the attainment of that goal. Confidence is high in this society because it is growing fast and rapidly increasing investments in the military, while the established power is divided, insular and increasingly prioritizing domestic needs over international ones.

This picture more or less characterizes the relationship between the US and China over the last fifteen years, and Trump’s victory needs to be placed in that context. Not coincidently, his rise coincides with some significant inflection points: China’s economy is now roughly equal in size to America’s, it is the world’s largest manufacturer, and its military expenditure is growing at double-digit rates. Current trends suggest that China will soon overtake America as the world’s leading state, and Americans are fiercely divided about how to manage the domestic and international challenges posed by this power transition.

Thus it is no coincidence that Trump’s major target is China or that his main campaign slogan, “Make America Great Again” is an implicit recognition of a sense of American decline. Other patterns fit the mold; as Gilpin might have predicted, China and the US are increasingly “bumping into each other”, as China makes territorial claims against America’s allies in the region. The domestic and psychological changes identified by Gilpin can also be observed. While the US is polarized, pessimistic, and prioritizing domestic needs, China is increasingly confident and becoming bolder in challenging the US-led order. Philippino President Rodrigo Duterte’s surprising defection to China despite his country’s long alliance with the US may be a sign of more to come.

Gilpin’s analysis of power transitions over 2500 years show that more often than not they result in war. In all the international power transitions he analyzes (Peloponnesian War, Punic wars, the Crusades, 30 years’ war, Napoleonic wars, World War 1), war was preceded by structural shifts in the distribution of power, an unwillingness of the established power to accept decline, the rising power’s increasing assertiveness and claim to rightful leadership, leading to disequilibrium, tensions, skirmishes, and conflict. This does not bode well for the Trump administration. Soon enough Trump may face a crisis in South East Asia that will test his resolve to defend a status quo characterized by waning American leadership. The alternative is to accept the structural shifts taking place and accede to China’s effective control of the region. If he refuses to bow to China’s claim of regional leadership, a high-stakes war is very likely. Gilpin shows that, during these types of “hegemonic” wars, at stake is not only or mainly military dominance, but also whose societal model gains prestige, radiates outwards and becomes the norm. A victory for China in any standoff with the US would also mean a triumph of China’s model of authoritarian state-capitalism, giving liberal democracy another major blow.