In March of this year, I gave a guest lecture at my place of employment, Trent university, on the European elections that took place on May 25th. Even then, pundits knew that the election would be significant, mainly because polls indicated a dramatic increase in support for radical, anti-EU parties. The neo-fascist character of some of these parties (such as Golden Dawn in Greece) played a major role in my talk. At the question and answer part of the lecture, one of my more perspicacious students asked me "what will happen if the fascists win power in Europe?" My response was that we will see "pressure towards the US to invade, conquer, and save Europe from itself--for the third time in the last 100 years".
Of course, I was greatly exaggerating (playful hyperbole can really spice up a lecture). For one, radical parties, fascist or not, did not win a majority of votes; pro-European parties control around 70% of the European Parliament. Second, even if they would have won a majority, their power would have mainly been relegated to legislation at the European level, which is not insignificant, but which should also not be exaggerated since most major decisions--in the areas of spending, taxation, and defense--are made at the national level. And lastly, it will be difficult for the radical parties to find common ground and coalesce on major issues. They agree on some things--they admire Putin, oppose globalization, immigration, and are nationalistic--but whether these areas of agreement are sufficient for them to unite is very much in doubt. The clearest example of this is that the UKIP in the UK has already refused to ally itself with the NF in France because of the anti-Semitic and racist streak in the latter, even though both strongly object to the euro and the EU.
Still, the significance of the vote should not be underestimated. The rise of radical parties in Europe is not a new phenomenon; their origins can be traced to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the consequent demise of Europe's post-war order. The nineties saw many parties abandon socialism as a political program and adopt the policies normally associated with the right, especially the acceptance of free markets and globalization. At the same time, the structural shifts in the global economy did not benefit many Europeans, especially those from the working class. These trends left many working class voters without a political party through which they could express their objection to the new economic and political order. The radical parties filled the gap, largely by appealing to themes that resonate with these voters--nationalism, opposition to immigration and globalization, and in particular, opposition to the euro, the establishment of which has helped to devastate many economies, especially in Southern Europe.
The euro zone crisis that started in 2010 has been a major factor in the rise of these radical parties. Of course, it is not the only explanation. The UK, which is growing at an enviable 3.2% and which did not adopt the common currency, was one of the countries which saw the greatest rise in support for the radical right; meanwhile, Italy, one of the countries that has suffered the most from the crisis (industrial production has decreased 25%, youth unemployment is at 40%, the already struggling South has become even poorer) elected a pro-Europe and pro-euro party. But these two countries do not really buck the trend. The euro zone crisis has strengthened euro-skepticism in the UK, mainly because it has seemingly proved to them that Brussels is out of touch, and that its grand schemes for unification are detrimental to the peoples of the continent. Meanwhile, Matteo Renzi won in Italy in part because he did not really campaign on a pro-euro platform (even though his party, the PD, is traditionally the most pro-European on Italy's political scene). Rather, he told voters that he would "stand up" to Brussels against the German-led austerity that many Italians feel is the source of the country's woes.
Now, across Europe, there is a sense that for the EU to survive, it must change direction towards less austerity and more growth. But in the humble view of this writer, this is largely wishful thinking, because for most of Europe's countries, especially the rich, mature, and developed Western part of the continent, it is not clear what, exactly, Brussels can do to promote growth. Many of the obstacles that hinder economic expansion are national or even local in character, especially in Southern Europe. For example, it has been estimated that gender inequality in Italy (which has some of the highest rates of female exclusion in Europe) has a significant economic cost: GDP would be around 6 or 7% higher if its levels of inequality were at or above Europe's average. Up to now, Europe's many and concerted efforts to increase gender equality in Italy have mostly failed. Why? Because the fundamental causes of this inequality are cultural, and it stretches the imagination to imagine that Brussels can have a significant impact on these culturally entrenched attitudes.
The largest impact of the result of these elections will probably be at the national, not the European, level. It will pressure some mainstream parties to adopt the rhetoric, or even the policies, of the radical parties. The largest threat perhaps is France, where the NF came first and trounced both the center-right and center-left. Despite its weaknesses, France is, after Germany, the most strategically important country in Europe. It is an essential partner to Germany in the attempts to stabilize the euro, and as a founding member of the EU, its preferences count more than most other European countries. The coming months and years will be crucial: if France's economic decline continues, the NF will have a decent chance of winning executive power at the national level, after which we could expect it to leave the euro, the EU, and re-establish the primacy of ethnic nationalism in domestic politics. And if that were to happen, many Europeans would probably welcome a US invasion to save Europe from itself.
Of course, I was greatly exaggerating (playful hyperbole can really spice up a lecture). For one, radical parties, fascist or not, did not win a majority of votes; pro-European parties control around 70% of the European Parliament. Second, even if they would have won a majority, their power would have mainly been relegated to legislation at the European level, which is not insignificant, but which should also not be exaggerated since most major decisions--in the areas of spending, taxation, and defense--are made at the national level. And lastly, it will be difficult for the radical parties to find common ground and coalesce on major issues. They agree on some things--they admire Putin, oppose globalization, immigration, and are nationalistic--but whether these areas of agreement are sufficient for them to unite is very much in doubt. The clearest example of this is that the UKIP in the UK has already refused to ally itself with the NF in France because of the anti-Semitic and racist streak in the latter, even though both strongly object to the euro and the EU.
Still, the significance of the vote should not be underestimated. The rise of radical parties in Europe is not a new phenomenon; their origins can be traced to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the consequent demise of Europe's post-war order. The nineties saw many parties abandon socialism as a political program and adopt the policies normally associated with the right, especially the acceptance of free markets and globalization. At the same time, the structural shifts in the global economy did not benefit many Europeans, especially those from the working class. These trends left many working class voters without a political party through which they could express their objection to the new economic and political order. The radical parties filled the gap, largely by appealing to themes that resonate with these voters--nationalism, opposition to immigration and globalization, and in particular, opposition to the euro, the establishment of which has helped to devastate many economies, especially in Southern Europe.
The euro zone crisis that started in 2010 has been a major factor in the rise of these radical parties. Of course, it is not the only explanation. The UK, which is growing at an enviable 3.2% and which did not adopt the common currency, was one of the countries which saw the greatest rise in support for the radical right; meanwhile, Italy, one of the countries that has suffered the most from the crisis (industrial production has decreased 25%, youth unemployment is at 40%, the already struggling South has become even poorer) elected a pro-Europe and pro-euro party. But these two countries do not really buck the trend. The euro zone crisis has strengthened euro-skepticism in the UK, mainly because it has seemingly proved to them that Brussels is out of touch, and that its grand schemes for unification are detrimental to the peoples of the continent. Meanwhile, Matteo Renzi won in Italy in part because he did not really campaign on a pro-euro platform (even though his party, the PD, is traditionally the most pro-European on Italy's political scene). Rather, he told voters that he would "stand up" to Brussels against the German-led austerity that many Italians feel is the source of the country's woes.
Now, across Europe, there is a sense that for the EU to survive, it must change direction towards less austerity and more growth. But in the humble view of this writer, this is largely wishful thinking, because for most of Europe's countries, especially the rich, mature, and developed Western part of the continent, it is not clear what, exactly, Brussels can do to promote growth. Many of the obstacles that hinder economic expansion are national or even local in character, especially in Southern Europe. For example, it has been estimated that gender inequality in Italy (which has some of the highest rates of female exclusion in Europe) has a significant economic cost: GDP would be around 6 or 7% higher if its levels of inequality were at or above Europe's average. Up to now, Europe's many and concerted efforts to increase gender equality in Italy have mostly failed. Why? Because the fundamental causes of this inequality are cultural, and it stretches the imagination to imagine that Brussels can have a significant impact on these culturally entrenched attitudes.
The largest impact of the result of these elections will probably be at the national, not the European, level. It will pressure some mainstream parties to adopt the rhetoric, or even the policies, of the radical parties. The largest threat perhaps is France, where the NF came first and trounced both the center-right and center-left. Despite its weaknesses, France is, after Germany, the most strategically important country in Europe. It is an essential partner to Germany in the attempts to stabilize the euro, and as a founding member of the EU, its preferences count more than most other European countries. The coming months and years will be crucial: if France's economic decline continues, the NF will have a decent chance of winning executive power at the national level, after which we could expect it to leave the euro, the EU, and re-establish the primacy of ethnic nationalism in domestic politics. And if that were to happen, many Europeans would probably welcome a US invasion to save Europe from itself.
