Thursday, July 19, 2018

Review of Edward Gibbon's "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire", Volumes 3 and 4

Last summer I made a commitment to read Edward Gibbon’s timeless and seminal text Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, and was able to complete the first two (out of six) volumes. This initial reading imparted lessons on the qualities of good leadership and on the causes of imperial growth and decay (my analysis of volumes one and two can be found here). Another important theme was the Christianization of Rome, a cultural and political revolution the scope and breadth of which has few parallels elsewhere in the annals of human history. I had the privilege of studying volumes three and four in August 2018, while in Italy, the territory which is at the centre of Gibbon’s masterpiece. In these sections, Decline and Fall places much more emphasis on Rome’s Christianization, documenting how this religion’s humble and revolutionary beginnings became corrupted by political power, fanaticism, and irreconcilable theological quarrels. On the basis of the textual evidence presented by Gibbon, one may conclude that Christianity is the direct cause of Rome’s fall; its enfeebling effects destroyed citizens’ martial spirit, making them no match against the ferocious and fecund Germanic barbarians who descended from their huts in the northern forests. But Gibbon’s arguments are more nuanced. My reading of volumes three and four is that Christianity hastened, but did not cause, Rome’s downfall. Rather, the collapse was the inevitable outcome of expansion, domination, growth, and prosperity. As Romans become richer and more powerful, luxury and pleasure, rather than virtue and honour, became reigning preoccupations, enervating the citizenry particularly vis-à-vis the Germanic tribes which eventually sacked the capital city and irreversibly extinguished the institutions established by Romulus, Rome’s founder, 1163 years prior.


In this essay I will begin by examining Gibbon’s presentation of the evolution of Christianity in the late imperial period, particularly via the lives of Christian emperors Theodosius and Justinian. Germanic barbarians, especially the Goths, Vandals, Huns, Franks, and Ostrogoths will also be the subject of analysis, as they deservedly receive considerable space in the Decline and Fall. Not only did they invade, occupy, and divide Roman provinces; they also became Romanized, adopting Christianity and elements of classical learning, creating a hybrid civilization of which Europe is the descendant.  Throughout, I will try to be faithful to the evidence presented by Gibbon and trace the elements which fatally weakened the empire, arguing that success contains within it the seeds of its own destruction—a lesson for all political experiments, ancient and present. Concluding sections will evaluate the Persian-Roman wars which undermined both civilizations and which set the stage for Islam’s triumph in the seventh century.


The Cross becomes Corrupted


As Gibbon minutely details in the first two volumes, Rome’s universalist orientation made it tolerant of the multitudinous religions across its vast territory. Christianity was one of the few religions in the empire that was brutally suppressed. As it spread rapidly by the proselytizing activities of its adherents (or Nazarenes, as they were then called), Roman authorities—correctly, it turns out—viewed it as an existential threat to Rome’s pagan-based order. Christians preached the metaphysical equality of humans, an affront to the natural hierarchy presumed by the pagans; they also disdained the riches and pleasures of the world, embraced poverty and hardship, obstinately refused to participate in the pagan festivals which formed an essential part of civic life, and abjured political activity, from voting to military service. They were uncompromising; rather than renounce their faith they were willing to be torn to pieces by beasts in the colosseum. In this phase of the revolution, the baser motives of lucre or power were mostly absent; it was driven by a puritanical drive to save mankind from sin and hellfire. Their willingness to suffer and die for their beliefs in front of tens of thousands of spectators in the colosseum helped to spread the faith among pagans, who were impressed by the bravery and courage of the martyrs.

Where Christians were martyred


This in itself is astonishing for contemporary Western readers, most of whom have been raised in a context of skepticism and relative material comfort and cannot imagine dying for an ideal. But for the purposes of this essay, what matters is that, as with other revolutionary movements, Christianity was soon corrupted by its own success. Initially it was purely idealistic, perhaps because it spread rapidly among women, slaves, and the poor. A major shift occurred when wealthy and politically powerful nobles began to convert; at this stage, the baser motive of material ambition began to influence adherents’ activities. When emperor Constantine converted on his deathbed, Christianity had reached the pinnacle of global power, although at this stage it was too late for him to implement a Christian state. Theodosius was arguably the first truly Christian emperor in the sense that he fully fused the law making powers of the imperial office with the new religion. Unsurprisingly, possession of absolute political power over a vast and diverse empire, and belief in absolute religious truth, shook the empire’s foundations to the core.

Although Theodosius preserved the architectural gems of antiquity, he began the process of extirpating paganism by systematically persecuting its adherents. Pagan practices such as sacrificing animals, and trying to divine the will of the gods by observing their entrails, became a crime of high treason, punishable by death. Idolatry, or ceremonies involving household gods, became punishable with fines. Pagans still enjoyed freedom of speech and other civil rights, but the laws against their religious practices were rigidly executed and, according to Gibbon, “contributed to the destruction of a religion which was supported by custom rather than argument. So rapid, and yet so gentle, was the fall of paganism that only 28 years after the death of Theodosius, the faint and minute vestiges were no longer visible to the eye of the legislator.”

Christianity’s early idealistic and humble origins also were compromised by theological quarrels over the nature of Christ. The Council of Nice presided by Constantine established the doctrine of the trinity—God, Jesus, and Holy spirit were separate but unified and consubstantial. The main heresy was Arianism, which presumed that Jesus the Son was separate from, and not equal to, God the Father. As this quarrel could not be settled with argument alone, political power was instrumentalized in the dispute. Theodosius viewed Arians as a threat and aimed to extinguish their beliefs. Between AD 380-394, he punished Arian teachers with exile or the confiscation of property. Their meetings, whether public or secret, were banned. Theodosius was not successful in stamping out Arianism, perhaps because it was the version of Christianity adopted by the Goths who would later rule Roman territories.

Despite Gibbon’s fierce criticism of Christianity at this stage in its evolution, he speaks favourably of the Christian emperor Theodosius mainly because he was the last Roman prince who enjoyed universal authority across a unified empire, and partly because he was willing to lead by example by leading his soldiers in the field of battle. The ascension to power of his sons, Arcadius and Honorius, represents a significant shift towards Rome’s decline.  Both were insular and did not possess their fathers’ courage or political engagement. They furthered the already existing internal division between the East and West; Arcadius ruled Eastern territories of Thrace (modern day Bulgaria and Greece) Asia Minor (modern day Turkey), Syria and Egypt, while Honorius was master of Italy, Africa (modern day Tunisia), Gaul (modern day France), Spain, and Britain. Although both considered themselves Romans, this formal political division became permanent and fatally weakened Rome just as Germanic barbarians were gaining in strength and numbers.

Ferocious and Warlike Germans


It was the Goths who dealt the first blow. Led by Alaric, they were unsatisfied with their subordinate role in the empire. During the reign of Theodosius, they received annual tributes and their soldiers were integrated in the Roman armed forces, policies which secured the peace. Alaric likely had designs for conquest but while the redoubtable Theodosius reigned, he avoided directly challenging Rome. The assumption to power of Arcadius and Honorius changed Alaric’s calculations; he saw an opening because the empire was now divided between two weak and insular siblings who lacked the courage and authority of their father. He was correct; upon hearing of Alaric’s impending invasion, Honorius, rather than leading the troops to fight him (as his father would have), fled to Ravenna and left Stilichos, a Roman general, with the responsibility to defend the nation. Initially Stilichos succeeded in repelling the attack, but with much difficulty partly because he could not raise sufficient numbers of soldiers and relied on disloyal Germanic mercenaries. Alaric ultimately triumphed and Rome’s humiliation was complete when he sacked the capital city. The slaughter was merciless, partly because Alaric had the assistance of many Germanic slaves who detested their Roman masters and conspired with him. Rome, the city which, through the force of arms, spread law and literature to the far ends of its vast empire, was now at the tender mercy of illiterate and ferocious Germans.

Germanic destroyers of Rome


Rome’s travails were only beginning. The wealthy Roman province of Africa (modern day Tunisia), which supplied the grain and corn that helped sustain the population and growth of the capital, was threatened by Vandals led by the ferocious barbarian Genseric. In 428 he had already settled on the coast, but on their own the Vandals were still insufficiently strong. The Germans were approached by the Moors (Berbers); the initial interaction of these two peoples who had never seen each other—one composed of tall, blue eyed, and faired haired Germans from northern forests, the other of locals with a smaller stature and olive complexion—was likely challenging because they did not speak each other’s language. After the initial difficulty, they discovered a mutual interest in wanting to defeat the Romans and quickly formed an alliance. The Moorish-German battalion defeated Roman troops and surrounded Hippo, the city inhabited by Saint Augustine, who witnessed the ensuing destruction; his timeless work The City of God was strongly influenced by this experience of witnessing an old order collapsing and a new one arising. (These events, Augustine correctly recognized, put to rest the fantasy held by many that Rome was favoured by the gods and was destined to forever rule mankind. It demonstrated that even the most powerful and advanced empires will, eventually, fall like a house a cards).

Alaric and Genseric were mild compared to Attila the Hun, who instilled terror in the hearts, not only of Romans, but also of other Germanic barbarians. The Huns came from Scythia (contemporary Northeastern Europe), and adored Mars, the god of war; but as they were incapable of forming an abstract idea or a corporeal representation of their deity, they represented it as, and worshipped, an iron butcher knife. Attila was able to amass an army of 700 thousand illiterate, warlike, and fierce soldiers; he successfully invaded Eastern Roman territories, but was repelled in Gaul by the Franks. When he invaded Italy, he found an exhausted people; the damage the Huns could have inflicted in Italy was prevented by intervention of Pope Leo, who appealed to Attila’s nobler sentiments. The deliverance of Italy was also purchased by giving Attila the beautiful Roman princess Honoria, which he gladly added to his already vast harem.

Before examining the textual evidence presented by Gibbon on the ultimate cause of these tragedies, it is worthwhile to consider the historical significance of the German triumph. Rome, a city founded by a humble Latin shepherd in 753 BC, might have remained, like most other ancient cities, insular and provincial. Instead it founded an empire with a universalist orientation based on citizenship and law. The Roman constitution was a major achievement, reconciling the principles of aristocracy and democracy by balancing the representation of the masses (plebeians) and the nobles (Senate) with the magistrates and executive. It was non-racial; indeed, modern concepts of race were alien to Romans. It offered citizenship to conquered peoples and accepted their gods into the pantheon of Roman deities. Roman engineering, art, law, and literature were spread around its territories in Western Europe, North Africa, and Asia minor. The capital was a magnet for merchants, workers, and others with ambition; at its peak, it housed and fed a million inhabitants, and no city during antiquity came close to this size. When the empire was strong, it was able to conquer and subdue its Germanic enemies, many of whom became Roman citizens and were fully integrated into the fabric of the empire.
           
Something dramatic and transformational occurred which allowed the Germans to overturn this millennial and unprecedented political experiment. One reading of the Decline and Fall is that Christianity is ultimately the cause. This explanation would confirm the observation of Rome’s pagan authorities who decided to persecute Christians because they viewed them as a major internal threat which would weaken the empire. Gibbon cites many factors that support this thesis. One is that Christians, unlike pagans, were more concerned with the next world than the present one. Rome’s pagan citizens, in contrast, were animated by pride in Rome’s achievements, in the wish to further them, and in the universalist orientation of their civilization which, they believed, was meant for all mankind, not only Latins. Early Christians saw only human vanity in this attempt for earthly glory; their greatest aspiration was the eternal bliss and majesty of heaven.

As the religion spread among Romans, internal divisions were created which were favourable to the barbarians. Christianity eventually reached the summit of political power, and as pagans were more and more oppressed, they were inclined to cheer for the Germanic hordes who crushed their Christian masters. Another aspect of Christianity that Gibbon cites as fatal was the establishment of monasteries. Originating in Egypt, this new institution was organized around asceticism, a contempt towards material achievement, and blind submission, or absolute obedience, to the Abbot. Athanasius brought this practice to Rome, and shortly after it spread across the empire, and attracted multitudes of men and women who devoted themselves to a life of meditation, solitude, and self-denial. Gibbon is particularly contemptuous of this institution because the servile obedience extinguished the freedom without which honour and virtue—the basis of Roman greatness according to Polybius—cannot develop. The men and women who fled to these monasteries often were motivated by poverty or distress and found relief from the food, shelter, and community of their fellow monks; but their commitment to monastic life contributed to fewer people willing to have children and fewer numbers of citizens willing to fight for the empire.
            
But other factors challenge the argument that Christianity is the main cause of Rome’s decline. The warlike Germanic barbarians, such as Alaric, Clovis, and Generic, who invaded and occupied Roman territories were Christians themselves or soon converted; adopting this religion evidently did not undermine their martial spirit or the fecundity of their troops. Some of the most talented Roman generals who scored major victories against the barbarians (Stilichos, Belisarius) were also Christians. The barbarian kingdoms which later formed on Roman territories were Christian but they did not necessarily display the pathologies of Rome in the late imperial period; in some cases, such as the Ostrogoth Theodoric’s reign in Italy, these German Christians oversaw an efflorescence and revival of the best features of Roman civilization. The demographic decline which weakened the empire can be imputed to some extent to the popularity of monasteries. But a more important cause was wealth and luxury, which Gibbon repeatedly says produced a “pusillanimous indolence” among soldiers and citizens alike.
            
As Romans became wealthy, they increasingly become concerned with enjoying the pleasures of the present and avoiding hardship and sacrifice. Consequently, they lost the martial spirit that allowed them to subdue Europe and Asia. One immediate result was fewer Romans who were willing to embrace the rigors and stresses of military life; previously, each Roman male was required to complete ten years of military service, and as the empire became more decadent, many wealthy families purchased exemptions from this obligation, forcing generals to rely on mercenaries motivated by profit rather than the ideals of Rome. And it was Germans who filled this military lacuna. They were not loyal, and were in fact a fifth column; when circumstances were right, they would turn against their Roman employer. When Alaric invaded, for example, he could rely on a large contingent of Gothic mercenaries who would abandon their Latin patrons and join the German effort. The Goths’ conquest of Italy also illustrates this point. Rome, or at least the Western empire, was finally and permanently extinguished when the Gothic Odoacer conquered the capital; this was made possible because the Germanic mercenaries who had previously fought for Rome fled to Odoacer when he promised them a third of Roman territories in exchange for joining his campaign.
            
Gibbon cites Greek scholars who documented Roman decadence. Priscus was so contemptuous of Rome that he decided to join the Huns, and even rose in their ranks. His literacy and erudition allowed him to observe and document some of the cultural differences between the Huns and the Romans. The former were motivated by glory and were willing to risk their lives for its attainment. Conversely, says Priscus, Roman princes were no longer willing to lead the fight as their predecessors had done (this is clearly evident in the example of Honorius who fled Rome to avoid fighting the Goths). Roman officials, from tax collectors to magistrates, were also increasingly motivated by lucre and were captured by the wealthy, leading to corruption which increased inequalities, creating the need for more laws which contradicted previous ones and which made the justice system even more complicated and dysfunctional. Under these conditions, many Latin Romans welcomed the Germanic barbarians.
            
It follows that the primary cause of Rome’s fall was internal not external; even if Germanic barbarians did not invade, the domestic rot would have inevitably led to collapse of some sort—either through civil war, or demographic decline, or the extinction of Republican institutions. The Germans who hastened Rome’s fall perhaps did not recognize that they would be destined to become acculturated by their more numerous and advanced subjects and, in the process, to preserve major elements of Roman civilization.


Romanization of Germans


Although the formal institutions of the Western part of the empire were expired by the barbarian invasions, elements of Roman civilization endured thanks to the Christianization of the German occupiers. This process began well before barbarians successfully invaded. During their intermittent warfare, many Romans were taken captives by the Germans and subsequently lived in their camps, where they made an effort to spread the gospel—an arduous task when one considers that the Germans were mostly illiterate, did not speak Latin, and had difficulty grasping theological abstractions. To facilitate their conversion, the gospel was translated to their native Teutonic tongue. Notable in this regard was Ulphilas, who mastered the Goths’ German language and invented an alphabet to compose it, which involved inventing four new letters to express sounds that did not exist in Greek or Latin. This allowed him to translate the gospel and convert the Germans. In the process, he introduced them to literature and conceptual abstraction, which opened the possibility of acquiring the art, literature, and architecture of the classical antiquity. The works of Virgil, Cicero and Livy were now accessible to the Germans; their children could become educated in some of the greatest and timeless works of classical antiquity.
            
Another notable change was the adoption of Roman law and jurisprudence, which introduced concepts and practices which were wholly alien to the Germans. Particularly in Gaul (modern day France) the Germans’ system of justice deserves the appellation “barbaric”. In cases of murder, penalties depended on the status of the victim, and the perpetrator could escape justice if he paid a fine. The Franks calculated that peasants’ lives were worth a fraction of a nobles’, and hence if the former was murdered, the perpetrator paid less. In other cases, personal revenge was encouraged as a speedy execution of justice.  During disputes over matters which required the intervention of a third party, illiterate judges would hear the accounts of the plaintiff and the defendant, and rather than rationally weighing evidence in light of established and abstract rules, the barbarian judge would accept mortal combat between the contestants (incidentally, this is the origin of duels, a practice which would persist well into the 19th century). If one of the parties declined to fight, his claim would be rejected because, the barbarians believed, cowards were dishonourable and hence could not be credible. And when combat proceeded, the victor was deemed to be favoured by the gods and pronounced as winner in the trial. It does not take much imagination to recognize that this oppressive justice system excluded the weak, sick, aged, and others who lacked the strength to defend their claim against a physically stronger opponent. By becoming literate, and embracing Roman law, Germans learned how to record general and abstract rules that were equally applicable to all citizens, and developed the capacity to rationally evaluate evidence in light of the law.  
            
Romanization was very uneven, and Gibbon demonstrates this with the comparison of Gaul and Britain. After the Franks occupied the Roman province of Gaul, imitation and social intercourse led, within the space of a lifetime, to their almost complete Romanization. Franks—ancestors of the French—adopted Catholicism, Roman jurisprudence, and became well versed in Roman art and literature. One Greek historian who travelled to Gaul in the late fourth century observed that he could barely recognize any difference between the Franks and Romans. The contrast with Britain is significant. After the Roman conquest, Latin, literature, and art were transmitted to this insular island. When Rome collapsed, it was the Saxons who invaded Britain. Unlike the Franks, they did not Romanize. Rather, they extinguished the Roman heritage, and consequently, Britain returned to its original pre-Roman state of under-development. Gibbon’s answer to the puzzle of why this occurred in Britain and not Gaul is that the former was insufficiently Romanized despite being a Roman province for four centuries; under these conditions, the Saxons could easily impose their culture.  And since Gaul was deeply Romanized, the conquering Franks—via marriage, trade, and imitation—insensibly adopted the culture of their subjects. If Gibbon were alive, he might say that Britain’s weak European identity and France’s deeply rooted European orientation may be traced to these distant events.

Some barbarian kings were quite virtuous and clearly impressed Gibbon. One in particular is the Ostrogoth Theodoric, who defeated the Gothic king Odoacer and reigned in Italy for 33 years. Under his rule, peace and prosperity returned to the country. Justice was efficient and impartial, and civil rights were protected. Trade increased, and the loss of Africa, which removed Rome’s major source of food, was replaced with the produce of the fertile soils of Sicily and Calabria. He was sensitive to the needs of the poor, and distributed meat and grain which relieved their distress. As trade and wealth increased, Rome once again became a magnet for merchants and others with material ambition.  Theodoric was an adherent of the Arian heresy, and most Italians were Catholic, yet he allowed freedom of worship and did not attempt to impose his personal theological interpretations on his subjects. Surviving texts attest to the universal admiration felt for Theodoric among Italy’s Latin and Catholic inhabitants.


Power shifts Eastward


The Western Roman empire was formally extinguished when, after Odoacer’s invasion of Italy, the Senate passed a motion which recognized the new barbarian king and which consented to moving the capital to Constantinople. The Byzantines displayed the features that Gibbon found so contemptuous in the West during the late imperial period. Although legally the Byzantine emperor was the legal descendent of Romulus, the appellation “Republic of Rome” had little meaning in a political order characterized with monarchical despotism; the liberty, virtue, and honour which so impressed the Greek historian Polybius was inconsistent with the servile obedience enforced by Constantinople. Christianity in the East was an instrument of political power and hierarchy, a far cry from its humble and revolutionary origins. And it promoted, says Gibbon, a fanaticism which destroyed the spirit of skepticism, seriously weakening the influence of Greek rationalism and science. Monks spread rapidly in Byzantine territories, reducing the numbers of citizens willing to fight for the empire.

However, Eastern Rome also demonstrates that Christianity is not necessarily inconsistent with the pursuit of material ambition in the present world, with improvements of law and governance, or with military conquest.  The court of Justinian receives ample space in the Decline and Fall perhaps because it displays all these elements. Justinian had barbarian origins, and rose to the throne after the death of his uncle Justin. A devout Catholic, Justinian endeavoured to crush the Arian heresy and to improve the administration of the empire. The complexity of Byzantine governance was the result of the accumulation of laws since Rome’s founding, which amounted to over 3 million lines in the law books. Justinian established a council of experts which reduced this number to 150 thousand lines, producing the Justinian Code which continued to be applied well into the modern period. He was also concerned with the beauty and grandeur of his capital, and the greatest monument to this inclination is the timeless and resplendent Hagia Sophia, which continues to attract millions or tourists (I visited in 2014 and can confirm that it is a remarkable structure). Bridges, aqueducts, and hospitals also were built by Justinian, infrastructure which assisted the rich and poor alike. Justinian also aimed to recapture the Western territories lost to the Germans. Unlike his predecessors, he did not lead by example and appear in the field with his men (Gibbon blames the East’s Hellenization for this pernicious development). Nonetheless, his talented general Belisarius successfully captured Italy from the Goths and Africa from the Vandals. At the peak of this triumph, he obtained half of the territory that was lost. These conquests were temporary for a variety of reasons, one of which was that, by then, many Latins actually preferred German rule.

Justinian fell in love with the licentious actress Theodora, whose intrigues would rival those of other Queens of antiquity and the present. He was seduced by her beauty and charm, but as a member of the royal family, he was legally not permitted to marry someone of Theodora’s class. To circumvent this, his uncle Justin changed the law, and they were married. When he became emperor, she was an equal partner in the governance of the empire, and she had a powerful influence of Theodosius’s lasting reforms and policies. Despite her devout Christianity, Theodora had little compunction about assassinating enemies and using her network of spies and collaborators to threaten and cajole senators and bishops who disobeyed her commands. She was concerned about the welfare of her poorer sisters, and converted palaces on the Bosporus to charitable residences which housed and clothed disadvantaged women; but evidently she did not want to contemplate the modesty and self-denial practiced by her most devout co-religionists. Rather, she accumulated riches and enjoyed the luxuries afforded by her position at the pinnacle of Roman power. Gibbon recounts one particularly striking example: when she fell ill, she would leave the capital and travel to a private spa with four thousand assistants who would satisfy her every whim and need.
Justinian and Theodora

The Eastern Roman empire survived until 1453, when their capital was conquered and occupied by the Turks. In other words, the Greek section of the Roman empire survived for over a thousand years after Rome was sacked and its institutions extinguished, and it endured despite its Christianity and decadent wealth—supposedly the main causes of Rome’s collapse. One possible answer to this puzzle is that the Byzantines benefited from the internal divisions among the barbarians, who, like their predecessors, were weakened by their own success. The Goths and the Lombards fought each other for Italy; the fights between the Goths and Vandals were ferocious, as were the battles between the Franks and Goths. Barbarians were divided over the spoils of war, especially territory, but as Christians they were not immune from the theological quarrels which had undermined their Latin predecessors (the orthodox king of Gaul, Clovis, invaded Italy to fight the Goths who had embraced the Arian heresy). And while barbarians were divided, Justinian negotiated peace with the Persian king Chrosoes. It was very expensive; Chrosoes demanded and received 11 thousand pounds of gold, but in return Justinian obtained a peace treaty which allowed him to allocate men and resources to the West to fight the Germans.
            
The peace between the Persians and the Byzantines was temporary, however. In 611, Chrosoes successfully invaded and occupied the Roman territories of Syria and Palestine, and in 616 took Egypt and Asia Minor. A major prize for the Persians was the holy city of Jerusalem which, at the time, was overwhelmingly populated by Christians. Persian armies were strengthened by the addition of Arabs and Jews who resented the Romans; When this alliance entered the holy city, over ninety thousand Christians were slaughtered. At the time, of course, Arabs were pagans, not Muslims, but one of them, a merchant from the obscure city of Mecca, received a revelation from the angel Gabriel. The prophet Mohamed subsequently sent a letter to Chrosoes inviting him to embrace Islam or the face the consequences of impending defeat by the Romans. The incredulous king ignored Mohammed’s injunction, which he may have later regretted when Mohamed’s prophecy came true: Byzantines successfully recaptured the territories lost to the Persians, and the Roman general Heraclius exacted bloody revenge when he occupied Persia, razed the capital, slaughtered many of its inhabitants, and destroyed major Zoroastrian temples. These battles were costly and bloody; Gibbon estimates that around 200 thousand Persians and Romans were killed.
            
Heraclius’s humiliation of Persia was temporary; the Persians regathered their strength and attacked, but at this point Constantinople could repel them. The two empires were roughly equal in strength, but both were motivated by glory and supremacy, and aimed to conquer each other’s opulent possessions. Peace between the Persians and the Eastern Romans was never permanently settled, and during this existential rivalry, Mohamed had successfully subdued the tribes of Arabia and unified their territory, establishing a new political order that posed an existential threat to both the Romans and Persians. When his successors Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali decided to attack, they greatly benefited from the divisions between the two ancient and powerful empires. Persia’s final blow came in 651, while Eastern Rome was finally extinguished in 1453 by the Turks. The caliphate prevailed, and Arabization proceeded; Romans and Persians converted to Islam, leading to the marginalization or near extinction of Zoroastrianism and Eastern Christianity in the lands that today we call the Middle East. This inter-imperial struggle between Eastern Rome, Persia, and Islam, the last’s ultimate triumph, and the resulting epochal cultural and political transformation will be examined on this blog in the summer or 2019, when I will have the opportunity to read the final volumes of Gibbon’s magisterial book.


Thursday, May 24, 2018

Review of François Hollande's "Les leçons du pouvoir" (Lessons of Power)

In early 2018 I was awarded a small research grant which funded an almost five-week sojourn in Paris. I was there between April 3rd and May 7th, and the purpose of the trip was to interview a small sample of French political actors and obtain sources at the French National Library which are unavailable in Canada. Collecting primary data is immensely valuable for developing insights on a distinct political context, but equally important is the opportunity to feel the local “pulse”. This occurs via conversations with politically engaged locals, reading newspapers, and watching television programs. An event that caused a stir during my stay in Paris was the publication of former French president François Hollande’s memoirs, titled Les leçons du pouvoir (Lessons of Power). It received extensive coverage in the French newspaper I regularly read (Le Monde) and on political talk shows, unsurprisingly, because he led the country during a crucial period in its history—2012 to 2017—when numerous thunderstorms, especially the financial and the migration crises, destabilized the continent and threatened to upend the entire European edifice. Hollande’s tenure still casts a shadow over the country; it ended with a historically significant election which culminated in a stand-off between Marine Le Pen and Emmanuel Macron. In some respects, this election was a replay of the political earthquakes that resulted in the triumph of Trump and Brexit, but France bucked the populist trend of its Anglo-Saxon partners and elected a liberal reformist who now embodies the hopes of liberals across Europe and around the world.
           
un président normal


François Hollande is not a scholar, and Les leçons du pouvoir is not a scholarly text. Nonetheless, students of political science and/or European politics will find that the book contains many valuable lessons about the character of governance, domestic and external, in one of Europe’s most important countries. Equally impressive are the portraits sketched by Hollande of key political leaders he closely worked with, such as current French president Emmanuel Macron and Russian president Vladimir Putin. Lastly, his reflections on the future of the centre-Left in France have lessons for this political family across the Western world. Recent elections point to the rise of identity politics, nationalism, populism, and xenophobia, trends that the traditional Left—which historically represented the interests of the working class—has struggled to respond to. As Hollande correctly notes, the existential challenge for the Left is to offer solutions to these trends that do not betray its cosmopolitan and internationalist orientation.

L’Etat C’est Moi

The executive branch in France is a unique hybrid, containing elements of classical presidentialism and traditional parliamentarianism. Regarding the latter, the country has a non-elected Prime-Minister who is mainly responsible for domestic affairs and who answers to the National Assembly. But, unique among Western democracies, this parliamentary practice co-exists with a directly elected president with broad powers over domestic and international affairs. In other European countries, presidential functions are mostly symbolic—presidents are not directly elected, are expected to incarnate the nation and be detached from the messiness of political partisanship. Not in France; although the president is ostensibly neutral, he in fact makes political decisions in the most ideologically contested spheres of society. And, unlike in other Western democracies, he does not need the consent of the legislature to pass crucial reforms or the budget.

This “elected monarchy” seems to be in tension with the radical democratic ethos associated with the revolution. Indeed it is, and one of the most fascinating parts of Les leçons du pouvoir is its account of the contradictory elements of French society which reflect the country’s institutions of governance, including the presidency. In Hollande’s own words:

our society demands authority even when it defies authoritarianism…the president must be at the same time distant and approachable, rigid and caring, majestic and modest, mysterious and transparent, monarchical and citizen.

Hollande was elected in 2012 and won, in part, because of frustration with his predecessor’s (Nicolas Sarkozy) feverish governing style and the wish for a “normal president”: calm, cerebral, poised, and dignified. At the time of his victory, France faced two serious challenges, namely a weak economy and the eurozone crisis. There were and are two broad options to the crisis, neoliberal or Keynesian, and Hollande, as a social democrat, subscribed to the latter. During the campaign, he promised to challenge the neoliberal approach, which in practice would have meant challenging German power in Europe. As often happens, the reality of power clashed with his ideals, and Hollande was unable to keep many of his promises. Nonetheless, he claims, with some justification, that his policies, especially in the labour market and for small enterprises, helped to turn things around. By the end of his tenure in 2017, growth had returned, even though it was feeble; unemployment numbers improved, although reaching a level (around 10%) that resembles France’s southern neighbours more than the economically dynamic countries of the North.

The relationship between France and Germany, and particularly Hollande and Merkel, forms a crucial part of the book; this is unsurprising, since their agreement is a sine qua non for major decisions in Europe. But this does not mean that, pace Hollande, equality reigns supreme between them. Particularly in the governance of the euro, Germany had the final say over major policies, a reality which Hollande indirectly admits when he says that, for his proposals to pass, “je dois conviancre l’Allemagne; les autres suivront” (I have to convince Germany; the others will follow). This reality of Germany’s effective veto chimes with the observations of another European statesman who published his memoirs, former Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis (my review of his book can be found here), which reveal the reality of German primacy beneath the surface of “partnership” and “multilateralism”. However, Germany does not exercise absolute control in Europe’s politics. Here, a distinction needs to be made between security and economic issues: Germany leads the latter, France the former.

Some of the more fascinating parts of the text are on France’s external relations, particularly in the realm of military affairs. In Africa, France intervenes unilaterally, especially in the francophone nations which are former French colonies and which continue to rely on the country for their security. Helping them to fight jihadists is an activity that Hollande is particularly proud of. He recounts the intervention in Mali in 2012, when Malian president Dioncounda Traore requested French military assistance. After obtaining the consent of neighbouring countries, French fighter jets pummeled the jihadists who, without this decision, would have, according Hollande, taken over the country and formed another caliphate. Afterwards he visited the country, and was greeted as a saviour by the president and by locals, an event he calls “le plus beau jour de ma vie politique” (the most beautiful moment in my political life). He describes it rather theatrically:

France demonstrated that she is capable of intervening without ulterior motives or based on selfish interests; the sole motive was to ensure the security of a region and serve a just cause. A decision made in a few minutes inside a gilded office in the presidential palace changed the destiny of an entire people and signaled a victory of democracy over barbarism.

Hollande clearly believes that France has the sacred mission to spread liberty around the world. Students of international politics will recognize parallels with the U.S.; both countries were born of radical revolutionary principles, in both centrist elites believe that they are uniquely in possession of universal political moral truth, and that they have a duty to spread the Word to mankind—whether mankind likes it or not. Hollande, unsurprisingly, is uncritical of this essentially religious belief, ignoring the tensions between its supernatural character and his country’s ostensibly secular state. Even worse, he completely ignores France’s role in causing chaos and instability while claiming to be defending the rights of man. France is one of the world’s largest producers of weapons, and one wonders whether Hollande lectures Saudi Arabia about human rights when it sells weapons to that country that are used to bomb civilians in Yemen. Libya is an even more damning example; it was Hollande’s predecessor, Nicolas Sarkozy, which led the overthrow of Ghaddafi—a policy apparently motivated by humanitarian principles and that Hollande’s party supported. Now, Libya is an unspeakable mess, with jihadists controlling half the country and slave markets reappearing in major cities.

This omission of France’s role in bringing death and chaos to the Middle East, rather than human rights and democracy, also has the whiff of hypocrisy when he criticizes America for destroying Iraq or when he condemns Vladimir Putin’s policies in Syria. Hollande frames the conflict in the latter country, predictably, as a democratic revolt against a barbarous dictator, while putting France on the side of justice and Putin on the side of the evil Assad regime. Unsurprisingly, he ignores the overwhelming influence of jihadists among the rebels, neglects to mention that Assad is supported by Syria’s minorities (and many members of the Sunni majority), and omits France’s role in perpetuating the civil war in the country by materially supporting one side (along with its ally Saudi Arabia, that paragon of human rights and democracy). His account of the Ukrainian crisis is not that much more nuanced, but it is more valuable because it provides an insiders account of his and Merkel’s negotiations with Vladimir Putin over the future of the country.
 
Cold as ice
After long and arduous negotiations between Hollande, Merkel, Putin, and Ukrainian president Porochenko in 2014, an agreement was reached which aimed to preserve the unity of Ukraine while responding to the concerns of the country’s large ethnic Russian minority. The accounts of these negotiations paint a fascinating portrait of Vladimir Putin, who, Hollande says

is muscular and mysterious, warm and attentive even while he is icy and brutal, always facing his interlocutor with his blue eyes which are simultaneously seductive and threatening; he has a deep sense of humour while being very cynical, and expresses the most acerbic ideas in a calm voice…he is cold, determined, unpredictable and tender.

According to Hollande, when France and Germany took a tough stance against Putin, they were speaking on “behalf of a united and determined Europe.” This is not really accurate, since Europe is actually divided on the major question of relations with Russia; strategically important countries, like Italy, actually prefer friendlier relations with their Eastern neighbour and oppose the policy of confrontation implemented by America, France, and Germany. Even in the latter two countries, moreover, major political actors want warmer ties with Russia (La France Insoumise and Front National in France, Social Democrats in Germany). Thus contra Hollande, the decisions taken by France and Germany vis-à-vis Russia do not reflect the will of Europe, nor does their governance over Europe’s foreign affairs—which takes place outside of the EU’s formal multilateral institutions—enjoy universal legitimacy.

Admittedly, Franco-German leadership arises out of functional necessity: the EU is composed of 27 members, each with different interests and ideals, and obtaining agreement among them requires a Herculean effort. This is not conducive to the swift and coherent decisions that are required to resolve international crises. There is a need for an expedited process, and the French-German duo arguably fills the void.  Les leçons du pouvoir provides support for this proposition when it recounts the eurozone crisis, which, during Hollande’s tenure, was existential in character. One particularly notable example was the European Council meeting of May 23, 2012; at the time, bankruptcy, collapse and another Great Depression were real threats. Immediate action was needed, and yet during the meeting, all 27 member states were given a voice. Predictably, agreement could not be reached, leading to a decision by the president of the European Council, Herman Van Rompuy, to reconvene in a month’s time so that they can once again discuss the proposals. According to Hollande,

banks were suffocating, markets were skeptical, countries were sliding into recession, but we could not react immediately…these methods [of decision making] slowed everything, and it is this that explains the inadequacy of Europe’s response to the crises.

Hollande’s major proposal to fight the crisis was informed by his Keynesian principles: a 100 billion euro investment fund to help countries in distress. Hollande succeeded, not because of the multilateral institutions of the EU, but rather because, in his own words, he convinced Germany. Once again, Hollande reveals the true leadership structure of the currency union: Germany has the final say over major policies in the form of an effective veto which others do not really have. This power structure is not visible if one only pays attention to the treaties or to the voting procedures of the multilateral meetings. It is revealed mainly when we get insider accounts of statesmen who participated in major decisions.

Hollande’s successor, Emmanuel Macron, embodies the hopes of many who desire a strong France which is able and willing to challenge German’s approach to managing Europe. At the time of this writing, Macron has been president for only a year and thus it is too early to tell whether he will succeed. To prevail he must unite the country around his vision of transforming France into a dynamic market oriented economy, while convincing foreign investors that France is open for business; in light of France’s statist traditions, this will be a tall order. Hollande’s portrait of Macron provides some scintillating details that suggest he is up to the task. Macron, says Hollande,

has a rare talent in uniting people who possess different political sensibilities…he knows how to seduce his interlocutor…his capacity to seduce entrepreneurs, his dynamism in promoting the French brand, and the confidence he inspires among investors could be assets that accelerate employment and economic growth.

Hollande also mentions some of Macron’s defects:

in 2015, Macron affirmed that there is an implicit nostalgia for the monarchy in France, the disappearance of which left a void at the summit of the state…since his election, it is clear that Macron governing style is an attempt to fill this void.
 
Liberals' last hope
Hollande also indirectly accuses Macron of treachery; although he does not use the word trahison (betrayal), it is implicit in the text: Macron was planning his campaign to replace Hollande while he was a minister in the latter’s government, and his program includes the attempt to replace the traditional left-right divide, which would entail the demise of Hollande’s socialist party.

The Future of the Centre Left

Students of political science will find Les leçons du pouvoir valuable for some of its observations on one of the signature developments of the last twenty years: the decline of the traditional Left. Hollande’s socialist party was decimated in the last election, but this trend is not unique to France. Recent elections in Germany and Italy have produced similar outcomes. Voters who, in the past, would have voted Left, are moving towards the extremes. There is wide agreement among political scientists on the main cause: the traditional Left responded to the needs of the working class, but structural trends, such as economic globalization, technological change, mass migration, and the rise of non-economic identity politics have led to voter re-alignments. The traditional Right remains the pro-business party, while the traditional Left has tried to reconcile the interests of the working class with its openness to migration, international trade, gender, racial, and LGBT concerns. Rightly or wrongly, large sections of the working class feel neglected and betrayed, which is why they are abandoning their former patrons in droves while moving towards sovereigntist parties who promise to use the nation-state to reassert control. This dynamic helps to explain the victory of Trump and the popularity of Bernie Sanders in the US; Brexit and the rise of Jeremy Corbyn in the UK; ADF’s triumph in Germany; and the recent populist victory in Italy.

Hollande says that this particular political situation leaves the traditional Left with two unpalatable choices. It can return to its roots and defend the interests of the working class, but at the expense of neglecting other groups, like migrants and minorities, and at the cost of denouncing economic globalization; doing this would mean betraying its cosmopolitan and internationalist orientation. Or it could build a shaky coalition of non-economic based identity groups (women, Muslims, non-whites, gays) and cosmopolitan professionals; this would mean abandoning the working class and driving them to the sovereigntist parties on the extreme left or right. Hollande’s solution to this conundrum will sound familiar to political observers: France must copy the Scandinavian countries, which seem to have the magic formula for reconciling the free market, openness to trade, migration, and social justice. Known as “flexi-security” in European parlance, it refers to the adoption of policies that protect workers, such as a strong welfare state, to cushion the blow of economic insecurity while funding educational and training programs which allow them to quickly adapt to globalization’s rapid competitive and technological pressures. Address the economic insecurity, the argument goes, and xenophobia will decline, making workers more open to migrants and other minorities. It is the centre-left, Hollande argues, which is uniquely capable of implementing this vision.

This program helped to guide Hollande’s actions as president of France. Although economic trends slightly improved during his tenure, he seems to have not convinced his countrymen. In the last presidential election, the extreme right (National Front) and extreme left (La France Insoumise) together took an unprecedented 40% of the national vote, and much of their support came from the working class voters who, in the past, would have voted for the centre-left. Although Macron, a pro-globalization reformist, ultimately prevailed, this does not reflect a radical change in the country. Macron’s victory can ultimately be traced to the peculiarities of France’s two round electoral system rather than widespread support for his vision (in the second round, the majority of voters’ first candidate is not an option, and so many voters abstain or they vote against one candidate rather than for another). Therefore, Hollande has not succeeded in slowing or reversing the slide towards radicalism. Many of my French friends strongly believe that if Macron fails, a sovereigntist will win the next election. In that case, France will likely follow Britain and exit the EU while erecting barriers to protect it against the destabilizing winds of globalization. The stakes of incumbent, therefore, are extremely high.