Monday, November 16, 2026

A review of Michele Houellebecq‘s “Anéantir”

Anéantir is the third novel I have read by Michele Houellebecq. The first two I reviewed, Soumission and Serotonin, were memorable expositions of the dark sides of modern life, especially features such as individualism, hedonism, and capitalism. In the present novel, he continues this interpretive scheme and, similar to the texts above, captures some of the deeper currents of modernity that many experience and can relate to but often cannot articulate. These include, but are not limited to, a deep insecurity and a sense of being subject to forces that we cannot control; the individual agency that ostensibly is the supreme value of the modern world provides very few, if any, tools to effectively deal with many challenges, especially related to the end of life. 

The title of the book, Anéantir, translates to annihilate, the verb of nihilism, or nothingness, and as reading proceeds, one encounters several different contexts in which this idea is used. By the end of the book, it becomes evident that the major theme is death, and particularly how it occurs and is often experienced in the contemporary Western world: suicide, both “normal” suicide, that is, by one’s own hand, via medical assistance, or cancer. Most contemporary readers, I suspect, have lost either loved ones, close or distant relatives, or acquaintances to one or several of those causes, and therefore have various degrees of familiarity with them.  This gives the characters of Anéantir a certain realism which makes it easy to forget one is reading a work of fiction. However, Anéantir also provides glimmers of hope, especially in its portrayal of the main characters, Paul and Prudence, who, in middle age and after a long marriage, rekindle their conjugal love which had, as so often occurs among long-term couples, disappeared.

Assisted suicide, “normal” suicide, and cancer

Many Western countries have in their law books the right to assisted death, although different countries have different regimes. Some, like Switzerland, allow assisted death for almost any reason, while in others, like Belgium, it is permitted for both mental and physical health problems. In Canada, at the time of writing, only those with a life-threatening disease qualify, although there are pressures to expand the options so that more patients, including the mentally unwell and children, have access. When the policy was introduced, defenders stated that only a limited number, those experiencing extreme suffering and near death, would qualify. Eventually, and arguably inevitably, criteria were loosened, and now many who potentially have many years of life ahead of them can obtain it. 

In some countries such as Canada or Denmark, it has become a leading cause of death among seniors, and there are serious questions about whether it is being implemented with proper safeguards, especially given the vulnerability of some recipients. I have directly experienced this; when my aged father was in a care home near Toronto, he was deteriorating—he could no longer walk or do anything for himself, could barely speak more than a few words, and had violent twitches, although he did not appear to be in pain. During one of our visits, he was accompanied by a nurse, and during the conversation I said something the nurse did not clearly hear (perhaps because we were wearing masks, as it was during the pandemic), and he replied to me, “you mean euthanasia”? I meant nothing of the sort, and did not have anything even related to this idea in my mind, but the nurse thought I did. This can be interpreted in many ways, but one is that it is a frequent topic of conversation between the staff and visiting family members, and so it was front and centre in his mind; consequently, ambiguity in the communication automatically led to that interpretation. 

My dad, in the end, died of natural causes, not euthanasia, one year later, but this experience led me to believe that many families in similar situations are given the option, and many accept it for reasons unrelated to pain, e.g., not wanting to burden others, or from the authority that accrues from medical staff, who present it as a medical option devoid of its moral complexities (there have been many reports of this occurring in Canadian hospitals and care homes, i.e., staff seemingly encouraging the option when the patient and their families are extremely vulnerable).

Houellebecq is a well-known critic of euthanasia, and readers of Anéantir will encounter some of the reasons for his opposition through one of the characters, Édouard, who was a long-time civil servant in the French secret services, a patriot who, his entire life, loved and served his country. In his retirement, he was in relatively good health and in a happy relationship with his second wife, but he suffered a stroke that left him completely paralyzed and unable to communicate vocally. He is otherwise healthy and therefore could potentially live many more years. In the hospital, he is treated well because of the dedicated staff and supportive family, but things take a dark turn when his situation stabilizes and, in accordance with French law, he must leave the hospital and go to the EPHAD (France’s retirement care home system). By now, the regime of medically assisted dying is in full swing and, given Édouard’s condition, he would be unable to oppose it if administered. Moreover, the pitiful state of French finances is creating pressure to reduce public expenditure, and euthanasia clearly helps achieve that objective given how expensive it is to provide 24-hour care to senior citizens. 

Édouard’s family, aware that their father will likely meet this fate, decides to take the law into their own hands and hires the services of an anti-euthanasia group, loosely associated with some shady orthodox Catholic organization opposed to euthanasia, and which helps families save their loved ones from such an outcome. The operation goes smoothly, and Édouard is taken to his home where he can be cared for by his family. One reason for the success of the operation was the assistance of Maryse, a nurse at the hospital who helped care for Édouard and who was in a romantic relationship with Aurelian, Édouard’s son. Aurelian was in the process of divorcing Indy, an obnoxious woke Parisian journalist who is perhaps the most unsympathetic character—self-righteous, dogmatic, who politicizes everything, and therefore renders toxic even the most ordinary occurrences, such as family dinner. The relationship had been broken for many years, and Aurelian finally decides to divorce her, and shortly after falls in love with Maryse, a black immigrant to France, who is presented as the exact opposite as Indy: charming, loving, dedicated, honest, and therefore pleasant to be around. When Indy learns about the “kidnapping”, and that Maryse is involved, she publishes a piece about it, and a scandal erupts; one consequence is that Maryse’s visa will be revoked and therefore she and Aurelian cannot continue their life together. In one of the more shocking scenes of the book, Aurelian commits suicide.

Aurelian is, in his own way, a symptom of the modern world. He was the youngest of Édouard’s sons, and was raised in the 90s and early 2000s, when the digital world already played a dominant role in daily life. As is well documented, Aurelian’s generation (“generation X”) is among the most mentally fragile, an outcome not unrelated to some aspects of late liberal modernity. These include online interactions replacing face-to-face ones, political correctness, and identity politics, which includes, inter alia, the idea that words and even jokes can be violent, the medicalization of experiences that in the past would have been understood as normal challenges related to growing up, and the obsession with safety, which has made young people more fragile.  Preceding his suicide, Aurelian was experiencing real hardship—going through a divorce, facing the imminent rupture of a relationship with someone he was deeply in love with—but because of his upbringing, he did not have the tools to deal with it. Moreover, like most modern French, he did not believe in the Catholic faith of his ancestors, which would have made him think twice about the moral implications of his decision, given that the Church unambiguously condemns it as one of the gravest of sins. 

Cecile, Édouard’s daughter and Aurelian’s older sister, is the only member of the family who has a deep and genuine belief in the Catholic faith, and perhaps not coincidentally, she is one of the more sympathetic characters. She and her husband, Herve, in many ways represent a France that no longer exists. They have been together since youth, and for both, most likely, their union was also their first romantic experience. They have two children and are committed to their families above all else, including personal happiness. They have humble jobs, and their economic situation has become precarious in part because of the changes related to globalization. The simple things in life—a family meal, going to Mass, meeting neighbors—bring them much joy. Despite their commitment to the Church, they are not dogmatic in the least, and especially Cecile displays a kind of innocent and naïve, completely uncynical, love for humanity and for life. In other words, they are the opposite of the stereotypical woke Parisian represented by Indy.

Cécile’s and Hervé’s relation to the theme and title of the book, Anéantir, is perhaps better understood when juxtaposed with Cécile’s older brother and Édouard’s son, Paul, and his wife, Prudence. Paul, in many ways, represents the typical pathway of an upper-class Frenchman—went to top schools, throughout had many sexual experiences before meeting and marrying Prudence (she, too, almost certainly previously had many sexual partners), and has a relatively successful career in the ministry of finance, where he assists and regularly interacts with France’s political elite. They are childless—also a common feature of modern relationships—deciding to focus on careers and other pursuits. As often occurs, after years of marriage, their romance withers away, and they sleep in separate bedrooms, eat separately, and even have separate sections in the fridge for their food. In the meantime, Prudence converts to the Wiccan religion, which more or less is a deification of nature and also very revealing of modern France and, by extension, modern life—the decline of Christianity does not lead to secularism. Rather, new religious tendencies emerge, and Wiccanism fits quite comfortably with contemporary environmentalist sensibilities to revere and worship nature.

Many couples who grow apart this way and who are childless eventually divorce, but the unexpected and extraordinary do sometimes occur, as happens when their love gradually rekindles. As is the case with so much in life, it happens because of almost completely unrelated events. After the kidnapping of Édouard, he goes to live his remaining days in his home with his loving wife Madeleine, which happens to be in the beautiful and luscious French countryside, with vineyards across a hilly plain and forests on the horizon, which, during sunrise or sunset, display a lively interplay of the blue sky, the green vegetation, and the golden sun. Paul and Prudence frequently go to visit Édouard, and while there as guests, it would be awkward for this married couple to sleep in separate bedrooms. The loving environment and example provided by Cecile and Herve, and by Édouard and Madeleine, adds to this mix of natural beauty, an older and purer France, and the circumstances of being guests—that is, away from their Parisian apartment where they had been living separate lives despite residing in the same apartment. When they finally make love—perhaps after more than ten years since the last time—there is a sense of fulfilment, accomplishment, joy, and excitement, in part because Houellebecq has primed the reader to want this outcome, given how sympathetic Paul and Prudence are. I also suspect that many readers who are in long-term relationships that have become somewhat arid will find much hope in these passages. 

As is the case in real life, and so in Houellebecq’s novels, these happy occurrences do not translate into happy endings, and here we come to another theme related to the title of the book, and that is cancer. Paul is about 50 years old, generally healthy, without any particularly notable risk factors such as family history or unhealthy habits. And yet an ordinary trip to the dentist for a painful tooth, something almost everyone has to do one time or another, leads to the discovery of a tumor. Treatment options are not good—surgery to remove the tongue, which would permanently disable his ability to speak, or chemotherapy-radiation, which, for this type of cancer, has a very uncertain outcome. Paul wants to avoid losing his ability to speak, and therefore takes a gamble with the alternative, which is not successful. At this stage, his only hope is experimental, potentially promising therapies which, as so often occurs, are not effective. 

Here Houellebecq, as with the other themes, captures an important part of the spirit of the times and relates it to the book’s overarching theme. Cancer today is similar to AIDS in the 80s and 90s—terrifying, almost to the point of obsession—in part because it would strike people in their youth or middle age, when one expects to be in their prime. In many ways, however, it is worse; although AIDS was merciless, its victims were mostly people who engaged in risky behaviors (except, of course, those who were victims of medical malpractice, via contaminated blood or medical instruments). Cancer, in contrast, is far more arbitrary, and especially in the contemporary period, many victims are similar to Paul—middle-aged, with no family history, lifestyle habits, or other risk factors. This is something I suspect will resonate with many readers of Anéantir. In my own case, in the past 8 years, three people very close to me, in their 30s or 40s, died from cancer. Because of this experience, I am somewhat familiar with the various phases, including the very end, when traditional interventions like surgery and chemotherapy are not effective, and hope is placed in experimental but untested therapies. This hope derives in part from the modern faith in “science,” which in some cases has an almost religious-like character (this was evident during the pandemic, when disputes over lockdowns and vaccines were framed as “believers” in science and their opponents). The men and women in white coats working in labs have, in some cases, replaced the priests working in parishes as the object of reverence, but, as Paul’s, and many others experience, this is sometimes misplaced.

The modern world does not provide Paul with the tools to deal with his impending and untimely death. Moreover, he must face this just after the resumption and happiness of his conjugal love.  What can he do? There are several options available to him in Anéantir. One is the religion of his beloved, Prudence, which adopts the idea of reincarnation; therefore, Paul can expect to return to this world as another human or, in some cases, as an animal. To the question of his impending separation from Prudence, it offers the tantalizing possibility that they may meet again. She too will die and, according to the religion, will be reincarnated, and it is hoped they will somehow be reunited in their future lives (although this depends on the assumption that they will return as the same gender and same species as in previous lives, and during the same time period). Paul finds little solace in this, but neither does he in the possibilities offered by the religion of his ancestors (and his sister), namely, a place in heaven with the creator and/or some future resurrection. He therefore must face the despair of nothingness, or nihilism, which is the logical implication of liberal modernity’s assumptions. 

The question posed by this predicament in Anéantir is not whether one religion is true or not, but rather which one helps face the inevitable better. From the characters’ lives, one may conclude that it is the Catholic faith. The most miserable is Indy, the woke Parisian journalist; her obsession with identity politics generates bitterness while young and healthy, and we can deduce that while old and/or sick it will provide little comfort. At the other extreme we see the devout Catholic Cecile, who has a simple, uncynical love for her family and community, which creates a dense network of enriching ties with her neighbours. Rather than prioritizing career, travel, or other individual pleasures, she made the sacrifice and had children with whom she remains very close. Had it been she who was struck by cancer, she would have met the same fate but, unlike in Paul’s case, had the support of children, neighbours, and the church. One therefore gets the sense that pre-secular liberal France represented by Cécile was better at facing the age-old existential questions, and that late-modernity’s cocktail of individualism, identity politics, hedonism, and materialism provides little comfort at the end of life’s journey. 


Friday, October 23, 2026

Dignity in dementia

I originally titled this post Dignity of Dementia, but that did not quite sound right, as the disease itself has no dignity; quite the opposite, in fact. For my mom, who was diagnosed with dementia 2 years ago (when she was 77 years old), it has been in many ways manifestly undignified. Her character has been transformed: previously, she was loud, gregarious, and displayed a zest for life. When I would be depressed, perhaps because of a recent breakup, she would remind me not to forget “la vita è bella” (life is beautiful), which was her simple Italian way of saying it is precious and should not be wasted, including over girls who were not suitable for me. She had intense emotions, good and bad. When angry, it was often to a degree that I found frightening; when happy, often over the simplest things like a family get-together, the joy was that of the pure happiness of a child getting his or her birthday or Christmas presents. She frequently enjoyed going out for shopping, to visit friends or family, or simply to go for a walk.

Now, that is all gone. Emotionally, she seems inert. Although often smiling, it does not seem to be directed at any object or event; rather, it is accompanied by a blank stare, and a part of me thinks it is produced by the medication rather than as a reaction to her surroundings or to happy thoughts that correspond to reality. The loud, gregarious, and vocal woman of only a few years ago is now mostly silent, and never takes the initiative to say or do anything. She’ll respond yes or no to a question, but this too is unconnected to reality. For example, if I ask “hai mangiato” (did you eat), she says yes even though she may not have eaten at all. The outgoing lady who jumped at the possibility to have a coffee with friends or family now sits on the couch, and will not move unless someone guides her to the bathroom, bedroom, or to the main entrance of the house. 

On the other hand, in this lamentable state, I have unexpectedly discovered a dignity which is not unrelated to the disease. One is her relationship with her partner of 40 years, Sergio, who is 91 and who remains mostly cognitively lucid even though he is physically frail. I was a little boy when they began their relationship and have no memories of any friction; in fact, pictures from that period indicate that they were quite happy. However, I do have vivid memories of the late 2010s and early 2020s, and they were constantly fighting, mainly because my mom was not happy with him. One complaint was that he drank too much; others were that, when he drank, he would annoyingly repeat the same thing over and over again. I recall several Christmases when we were all at the table—me, my brothers, my mom and Sergio—and she would have an expression of deep disgust about him. Many long-term couples, of course, experience this, but in my mom’s case, it seemed, consistent with her character, to be of an intensity that made me question how long they could stay together. Moreover, they economically depended on each other, and so it appeared that my mom was being forced by circumstances beyond her control to be in a profoundly unhappy relationship. 

That conflict between my mom and Sergio has also disappeared with the onset of her dementia. Completely unexpectedly, I have observed in the last two years a rekindling of their romantic love. I am often overseas, and when I go to Toronto for Christmas or over the summer, I stay with my mom and Sergio and have witnessed them cuddling in bed several times. When my mom leaves the house for an appointment, they kiss on the lips to say goodbye. This romance is occurring even while Sergio is doing decidedly unromantic things, like accompanying her to the toilet or helping to change her diapers. The age difference between them—she’s in her late 70s, he’s in his early 90s—makes this even more odd. It appears that the dementia has changed my mom’s emotional responses but in a way that leaves space for the kind of romantic behaviours—cuddling, kissing on the lips, and who knows what else when I am not there—that one expects among much younger couples.

Another occurrence that can conceivably connect the noun “dignified” to dementia is related to the death of my youngest brother, my mom’s youngest son, in September 2026. Had this tragedy happened before my mom’s illness, her reaction would likely have been extreme, given the intensity of her emotional reactions, good and bad, to other things in life. He was the baby of the family, the cutest, and he looked just like her—the structure of their faces, skin, and hair was almost identical. He also was the least mature, and therefore the most childlike among four brothers, and so her motherly instinct for protection and nourishment perhaps led her to be far more invested in him. I was not there when the news was given to her that he died, but my older brother and aunt explained to me that she understood, but after 5 minutes or so, seemed to have forgotten. When I travelled to Toronto to attend the funeral (we decided that mom would not attend), I stayed with my mom and Sergio, and in the moments leading up to my arrival to their house from the airport, I was terrified of seeing her because I was expecting to see the “normal” reaction of a mother who had lost a son. To my great surprise and bewilderment, when we encountered and embraced, she did not mention it at all, and so neither did I. Over the subsequent days (I stayed with them for a week), not once was it mentioned, and she seemed to be completely unaware of the tragedy. For me, this was a great relief. Even more, in a strange sense, it made me grateful that this tragedy happened when my mom had dementia rather than before, when she would have had to deal with it like a “normal” person. 

Hence the title of this post, Dignity in Dementia, which refers to some experiences of living with the disease that are better than the alternatives without it. Of course, I would prefer that this illness was curable, and that my mom could recover her previous outgoing, gregarious, emotionally intense self. It would be far preferable if she did not need assistance with the most basic tasks, such as going to the toilet, washing, or dressing. Moreover, a cure for dementia would offer hope to millions of families who must suffer because of it, and for the present generations who are terrified of old age in part because of the indignities associated with the disease. But in my mom’s case, the story is more complex. Her rekindled love affair with her long-time partner and her unnaturally muted reaction to the death of her son indicate that tiny but significant unexpected miracles can occur, including, evidently, while living with dementia. 


Progress on Mandarin: Beginning HSK 6

One of the more remarkable experiences over the past several years is learning Mandarin. I have documented the various stages of this journey here and here, and in this post, I will recount my latest accomplishment, namely, completing HSK 5 and beginning HSK 6, which places me squarely in the beginning of the advanced level.

People often use the term “fluent” to describe their language ability; in my view, this is vague and imprecise, as it means different things to different people. For some, it refers to the capacity to communicate effectively in simple but necessary interactions such as eating at a restaurant, taking a cab, or ordering a service, which is often sufficient for foreigners living in the country where the language is spoken. For others, including me, fluency rather means the capacity to effectively communicate about most conversational topics. But here, too, the definition lacks precision. For example, even in my native languages, English and Italian, I sometimes struggle to speak about topics I am unfamiliar with, but that my interlocutor knows well. Here, the lack of fluency comes from the lack of knowledge about the subject rather than language per say.

The spectrum of beginner, intermediate, and advanced, I think, is more helpful in capturing the various levels of a skill, including language, and the HSK system for learning Mandarin is structured around these differences.  It also recognizes that there are importance variations within them. For example, absolute beginners know basically nothing, while simply “beginners” already have basic vocabulary and can structure simple sentences. Ditto for intermediate and advanced. Thus, beginning HSK 6 places me at the end of intermediate; in other words, I am still quite far from being at the most advanced level. In fact, at the pace of my learning, it would probably take another two years to get there.

More concretely, what does this level mean in terms of actual capability? I have now lost count on the number of characters I have memorized, but my closest approximation is around 1000. This means that I can read Mandarin if it is on a topic I am familiar with. For example, many of the lessons with my teacher are on technological change (internet, smartphones, AI, etc). Now, if I read content on that topic, I can recognize between 65% and 85% of the characters, and can therefore extract the overall meaning of the text despite there being a sizable number of unfamiliar words. The same applies to topics related to economics or finance, which also are a significant portion of HSK 5 level lessons. To be fully literate in Chinese, it is said, one must know the 1500 characters that are used in 90% of text; I’m almost there, and I estimate that by the end of 2027, when I turn 50 years old, I will achieve that objective. 

Another concrete manifestation of HSK 6 is that, when communicating in Chinese, I more and more use Chinese grammatical and syntactical structures rather than, as is the case at earlier levels, using sentence structures that represent direct translations from the native language, a process which emerges from the tendency to think in the native language and then directly translate the vocabulary. Doing so can work in the sense that the listener understands, but it nonetheless is indicative of beginner or intermediate levels. For example, in English, when it is said “I cannot do this”, the direct translation in Mandarin is 我不可以做 (wo bu ke yi zuo); when used, native Mandarin speakers will understand, but in actual Chinese, this kind of meaning is communicated differently depending on context. For example, the Chinese will often say 我做不到; the actual sequential meaning of those characters is “I do can’t done”, and the syntactical meaning directly translated to English is “I can’t/didn’t do it”; or they will say 我做不了; here the sequential meaning of the characters is “I do not unable,” but which actually means “I can’t do it because I do not have the capability to.” Progressing to advanced, language learners more and more communicate using actual Chinese structures that do not have exact equivalents in other languages, and this occurs because one thinks less and less first in the native language, directly translates, and then speaks. Rather, communication has more of an automatic character; structure and meaning are processed independently of the native language and therefore more closely approximate how native speakers communicate. 

HSK 6 level also means, of course, that I can speak about more advanced and abstract topics, including history, politics, culture, economics, and health. This capability is not unique to HSK 6; at the HSK 5 level I could already do this, but often with difficulty because at times I lacked the vocabulary to convey what I wanted to say, and made many mistakes in vocabulary and structure. Now, I can speak about these subjects with more depth and nuance while making fewer mistakes, and so, on this measure, it is a question of degree, not of kind. I am assuming that at the most advanced level, therefore, I will be able to speak about all these subjects while hardly making any errors, and rarely struggling with vocabulary. 

Despite reaching this advanced level, I still find myself in the odd situation, common among language learners, of fumbling simple words. For example, the other day, I had a lesson with my teacher, and the subject was related to biology as a science, and relatively complex concepts were employed during the conversation. Later in the day, my landlord came to do some repairs in the bathroom, and I was able to communicate with her smoothly until I asked her about the previous tenant and mixed up the very simple words “rent” and “tenant.” She understood my meaning, and the mistake did not impede our communication, but it reminded me of this tendency, which I experienced when I was in Paris studying French—as I reached the advanced level, there were days when I would use French to speak about a complex topic related to politics, history, or finance, and the very same day I would fumble simple words in some ordinary interaction with the staff at the university dormitory. Importantly, I can also fumble simple words in English and Italian if the situation is out of the ordinary, or refers to simple objects I have not thought about in a long time. Therefore, it seems that this is inevitable in any language, regardless of the level. That’s why it is so important to live at least for a period of time in the country where the language one is learning is spoken; these random day-to-day interactions with native speakers often require and therefore force us to learn simple vocabulary or expressions that are not acquired in a textbook or during class. 


Wednesday, September 2, 2026

A Review of Tom Holland's "Dominion"

Dominion is the third book by Tom Holland that I have read in the past two years, and my reviews of the first two can be found here and here. In all three, we encounter fascinating details about antiquity, presented in Holland’s signature engaging and lively prose. The present work stands out in that it traces and documents one of classical antiquity’s greatest legacies, namely, the emergence of Christianity, which represents, for reasons which we will see below, the most revolutionary outcome in all of human history. It would become the world’s largest religion and spread across virtually all parts of the globe. It overturned the classical world’s deepest assumptions about humanity, even though in some ways it is very much a product of that period; this paradox lies at the heart of Christianity’s impact on world history, making this a subject of enduring fascination and intellectual contestation. In this review of Tom Holland’s Dominion, I will present some of the more salient features of how Christianity revolutionized language, morality, law, and politics in Europe and beyond, and then offer a few minor critiques of what is overall a highly enjoyable and engaging text.

Antiquity

The ancient world continues to evoke awe and fascination among many contemporaries, myself included, and one of Tom Holland’s gifts is to bring it to life; through his account of the main characters and stories, he adds flesh and therefore humanity to what is often visually represented by the ruins of Rome’s great monuments. It is relatively easy to see how different Romans and other ancients were from us moderns in terms of technology or economic development, but much less so in terms of beliefs, norms, and how these translated into legal and political frameworks. For instance, homosexuality was tolerated, but not in terms of how contemporaries might understand it as a monogamous union based on love. Rather, married men could do as they pleased, sexually speaking, with their slaves or servants, regardless of gender. Here, stigmatization occurred only if the man was the recipient of penetration, highlighting how power hierarchies were deeply entangled with sex. The concepts of sexual orientation or homosexuality did not exist; this in itself might be difficult for the contemporary reader to imagine, given how much they are ingrained and taken for granted.

Readers of Dominion will discover that it was Saint Paul who created an entirely new category of sexual relations to include same-sex partners. As is well known, he had a decisive role in formulating and propagating the new belief system across Roman territories and beyond, and in so doing, he included many of his own interpretations which reflected his upbringing and training as a Pharisee, the scholarly class of Judeans who had very different sexual norms from the Romans. In his travels across the empire, he witnessed and was repulsed by Roman sexual practices, and in his efforts to interpret and analyse them, developed the vocabulary to refer to women and men who preferred partners of the same sex. His purpose, of course, was to define proper sexual conduct as heterosexual and monogamous. Paul’s successors in the Church went further and defined traditional marriage as a sacrament, and therefore unbreakable except in the rarest of circumstances. This new conception included the necessity of the consent, and therefore love, of both parties. Together, these features—sacred, monogamous, consent-dependent, life-long—represented a revolution in human sexuality that lasted the better part of 1900 years. That it developed a taken-for-granted status and was rarely questioned only highlights how thoroughly ingrained this arguably unnatural (in the neutral sense) institutional form became. 

The notion that there is a sphere of life we call “religion” separate from other spheres also did not exist in ancient Rome, or in other civilizations. In Latin, the word “religio” referred to what man owed to the gods, but religious practices were thoroughly integrated in daily life, society, and politics. One of the important offices of the Roman state, for example, was Pontifex, and, among other things, was considered a bridge between the gods and the state. Functions included interpreting the will of the gods for decisions on war and peace or other important political matters. Individual households had gods, and ancestor worship was the norm. Social life was characterized by regular rites and festivals, rich in symbolism that connected the material and the supernatural worlds. Belief in gods was either taken for granted or less important than participation in the rituals inherited from ancestors. With the emergence of Christianity, belief became central, and in so doing interiorized religion in ways that would have been alien to previous generations. As ever, it was Paul who helped to define and shape what these beliefs were. They included to love and care for others as we would want for ourselves, also known as the golden rule, which he said is the new law, or covenant between man and God, which replaces the old. 

This was innovative in many ways, one of which is how it radically redesigned group membership, which previously was based on birth or legal citizenship. Now, it depended on belief, which in principle was open to all regardless of origin or socioeconomic status. With the formulation of the Nicene Creed in 325 AD, which would be propagated to every church and parish in the Roman Empire from Britain to Syria, and which is still expressed every Sunday in Mass, the new definition of group membership based on belief became widespread. In Dominion, we are helpfully reminded how this occurred only 100 years after Roman Emperor Caracalla granted citizenship to all inhabitants of the empire, and the proximity between these two events greatly helps to understand Christianity’s transformative impact. Rome perhaps was one of the first examples of globalization in the sense that such vast space under a single administration greatly reduced barriers to the movement of goods, people, and ideas. Caracalla’s granting of citizenship was perhaps the apotheosis of this trend. Meanwhile, Christianity’s redefinition of group membership as based on belief was equally globalist, and the two developments coincided in ways that greatly enlarged the horizons of humans’ conception of themselves in relation to their fellows. 

These beliefs would overturn Rome's normative hierarchies, and here we have perhaps one of the most radical changes of all. During antiquity, Romans believed the gods favoured the strong—kings, conquerors, masters. They often raped mortal women and sired children who, because of their divine origins, were gifted in the arts of war and conquest. Even ancient Judeans believed that God would send them a messiah in the form of a warrior who would help to defeat the mighty Romans. The idea that God, instead, would take the form of a humble shepherd or carpenter, and would die by execution, for ancient both Romans and Jews, was grotesque and utterly incomprehensible. That God would take human form and preach that the last shall be first and the first shall be last (Matthew 20:16), and who commanded “whatever you do for the least….you do for me” (Matthew 25:40), for Jesus's contemporaries, was obscene. And yet these radical ideas were held with utmost conviction by Jesus’s followers, martyrs who experienced excruciating death rather than recant their beliefs.

Dominion traces the far-reaching implications of this radically new moral framework, the most important of which was the idea of human equality. If all were created in God’s image, and if the lowest had value, certain practices became conceptually untenable. One was slavery, and it was Gregory in the 3rd century who became history’s first recorded abolitionist. Of course, there were anti-slavery revolts well before Jesus, led by Spartacus in 75 BC, but they were fighting for the rights of their masters rather than to abolish the practice outright. Gregory’s efforts did not succeed, in part because the bible itself contained passages that justified slavery, and in part because it was an integral part of the economic structure. By the Middle Ages, slavery had largely disappeared from Europe, mainly because of the economic transition to feudalism, but in the Americas it remained widespread, and there, unlike in Europe, it was race-based, and consequently far more brutal. It was the Quakers in the late 18th century who, after witnessing the inhuman treatment of slaves, successfully led the efforts to abolish it. Importantly, they were not motivated by ideas of enlightenment or liberalism, but rather by their deeply held Christian faith, specifically that blacks were as much children of God as whites and therefore deserved dignified treatment.  

An idea that derives from the Christian assumption of “dignity” that most now take for granted is human rights, which has become an integral and largely unquestioned part of humanity’s moral grammar and vocabulary. Many readers are vaguely aware that, in the scope of human history, it is relatively recent, but fewer know that the origins are the church. It was Medieval canon lawyers who developed the idea of “rights”, applied in a rudimentary fashion to cases of marriage, property, inheritance, legitimate authority, etc, but several centuries would pass before the fully formed concept of universal human rights emerged, and the context was, again, the Americas, where colonialism led to the brutal treatment of locals. A Spanish priest, Bartolome de las Casas, who witnessed this, denounced it to the crown on the grounds, in his own words, that natives enjoyed “derechos humanos,” which derived from their status of being children of the same God. His detractors cited Aristotle in their rebuttal that some were destined to be slaves, but Las Casas's arguments convinced the crown, which ordered a halt to unjust treatment of the natives (given the great distances, this was not always enforceable). 

The idea of human rights would change history in other ways.  Both the American and French revolutions were led by actors who believed, falsely, that human rights were somehow inscribed in nature. In the American case, Christian assumptions—humans are endowed by their Creator—appeared—but in France, the Jacobins' virulently anti-Christian positions excluded this; consequently, they attempted to enact a moral framework, human equality, unmoored from its religious foundations. Some revolutionaries saw through the charade and were more intellectually honest, saying that if Christianity was to be abolished, its baggage would also have to be cast aside, and for this he was jailed, showing the limits of the Jacobins' commitment to the ideals they professed. Later, it was Nietzsche who most clearly saw through the blinders of modern ideologies and political movements that claimed to reject God even while promoting ideas, like human dignity for the oppressed or the poor, which derived from Christianity. Because Nietzsche clearly saw the Christian character of modern ideologies, which of course he opposed, he promoted a return to classical antiquity’s norms, which glorified conquest and cruelty. 

When Marx was writing his magnum opus in London, he perhaps did not look to them as an example, and in fact, as is well known, he condemned religion as the opium of the masses. And yet it would not be too much of a stretch to say that the first socialists were the apostles, even though this concept did not exist at the time: they sold all their possessions and held all goods in common, distributing them based on need. Jesus himself and his successors condemned greed and selfishness, and emphasised the need to help the poor, and this contributed to the radical break from classical antiquity’s moral framework of glorifying the strong. Marx was very much a product of this civilization, and as Dominion points out, the morally charged language used by Marx when referring to capitalists certainly did not derive from a strictly materialist conception of the cosmos. Thus, the attempt to separate communism from its religious underpinnings is an artifact of Marx’s status as an unbelieving German Jew rather than the substance of the ideology. 

Some of Marx’s successors saw this very clearly. Hugo Chavez, for example, was a populist, socialist, and devout Catholic. He was not in the least shy about how his faith informed his political beliefs, and during his rallies would ostentatiously display the cross. He only exaggerated a little when he said “Jesus was the first socialist”, as in fact it was his successors, the Apostles, who could more convincingly be described with that label. In this sense, he was more intellectually honest than many of secular Marxists who consciously or unconsciously attempt to unmoor communism from its religious roots. Another implication is that attempts to use Christian morality to justify capitalism, as is the case among many Protestants especially in the US, lack historical foundation. Certainly, the examples of Jesus and the apostles cannot be used to defend private property, the concentration of wealth in the hands of a small minority, or to object to the redistribution of wealth.

One of history’s puzzles is why Nazism is condemned far more than communism even though both are responsible for the deaths of tens of millions. Dominion provides a potential answer: communism is in many ways consistent with the Christian assumptions which saturate Western civilization, while Nazism, especially its idea of blood, soil, and racial hierarchy, is an explicit repudiation of it. Nazism, moreover, in some ways more closely resembles the pre-Christian past. For example, the Nazi practice of eugenics—sterilizing the weak or sick to create a stronger group—has its counterpart in the practice of Ancient Romans and Spartans of discarding babies deemed to be “defective”. This practice was abolished with the Christianization of the empire. Nazism, therefore, evokes greater disgust partly because it unconsciously violates norms which derive from the Christian heritage. 

Dominion explores the radical changes brought forth by the Protestant Revolution. In some ways, it went further in realizing the morality of human equality: by condemning the church hierarchy and making the bible the sole source of religious faith, it gave more agency to ordinary people in determining their own affairs. This decentralization and democratization of interpretation perhaps contributed to the tendency of protestants to develop more radical proposals for reform, including the anti-slavery efforts of the Quakers, and later of William Wilberforce in England. On the other hand, and here is where Dominion falls short somewhat, is that Protestantism also developed a tendency to adopt ideas that had no basis in the example of Jesus, his successors, and therefore in Christian morality. The most outrageous example is eugenics; in Western countries, it was Protestant countries which adopted it, and Catholic ones which condemned it and were a major obstacle to its implementation. In Canada, for example, the Protestant English-speaking provinces adopted eugenics as official policy, while French-speaking Quebec did not. Eugenics almost became policy in largely English-speaking Ontario, until the Bishop threatened politicians, telling them he would instruct Catholics to not vote for their party, and given their large numbers in the province, the threat was taken seriously and the proposal abandoned. In a similar vein, as Emmanuel Todd observed, the regions in Germany from which the Nazis enjoyed the greatest amount of support, and from which their leadership came, were mostly Protestant. This tendency of many Protestants to support morally questionable or outrageous endeavours was seen most recently in President Trump’s immoral war against Iran, which was strongly condemned by American Catholics, at both leadership and lay levels, while many American Protestants attempted to justify it by citing scripture.  

The question of the deeply paradoxical character of the Protestant Revolution, and how it could lead to both anti-slavery on one hand, and to racial supremacism and an utter disregard for human life on the other, is complex, and addressing it perhaps would have added unnecessary content to Dominion. But it is a question I have sometimes pondered, and would have liked to see Tom Holland’s impressive historical knowledge and analytical acumen deployed to provide a potential answer. On the other hand, Dominion provides clues that further our understanding in this direction. One of the characteristics of the Catholic Church, and especially its institutionalization of intellectual authority with high barriers to entry, was that the precepts were formed by scholars who applied the techniques of reason inherited from antiquity. This tendency of the Church to adopt some of the best parts of classical antiquity’s legacy can be seen most visibly in the consciously classical architecture of churches and cathedrals. Intellectually, it can be seen most obviously in the works of Saint Thomas Aquinas, who merged Christian teaching with Plato and Aristotle and who operated on the principle of universal reason. 

For Protestants, including Martin Luther, this represented what they called “paganism”, that is, importing non-Christian elements into the faith, and therefore needed to be extirpated. Coming back to the question posed above, this perhaps helps us understand some core differences between Catholicism and Protestantism. By preserving antiquity’s intellectual and artistic authority even while it discarded and transformed its moral framework, the Catholic Church perhaps preserved the rigours of philosophical thinking, especially rules on logical consistency, and consequently had higher standards and therefore a much higher threshold to cross for proposals and ideas to be accepted. By attempting to purify Christianity by throwing away the legacy of antiquity, and by rejecting intellectual authority, Protestantism perhaps became more prone to fanaticism, which was a double-edged sword. On one hand, it produced activists like the Quakers committed to ending injustice whatever the cost, but on the other, it produced those who used their faith to justify monstrous human practices, whether eugenics or the death and destruction of innocent life wrought by unnecessary wars in the Middle East. 




Wednesday, May 6, 2026

A review of Tom Holland's "Rubicon: The Triumph and Tragedy of the Roman Republic"

I recently had the pleasure of reading Rubicon: The Triumph and Tragedy of the Roman Republic, by Tom Holland, which maps one of the most impactful periods of Western history, namely, the end of the Roman Republic and its replacement with the non-republican regime of Emperor Augustus. It was in this period that some of history’s most fascinating characters emerged in the human pageant, such as Julius Caesar, whose image continues to reverberate to the present day, as a symbol of excess or heroism; many common English expressions, such as “the die has been cast” or “crossing the Rubicon,” come directly from his exploits over 2000 years ago. The text under discussion, therefore, extensively discusses Caesar, and in so doing gives readers scintillating details of this larger-than-life figure who evokes fascination, admiration, but also, in some instances, horror. Another important contribution of Rubicon that this blogpost will elaborate on is its account of Roman institutions such as citizenship and slavery. Contemporary readers know, of course, that they were two defining characteristics of ancient Rome, but often they remain theoretical abstractions given the gap between contemporary and ancient sensibilities and experiences. After reading the text, I had a somewhat better sense of these institutions as embodied, lived, and concrete realities, and consequently felt I could better understand what it was like to be alive during that time. 

 

Institutions: Citizenship and Slavery

 

Citizenship is a very basic concept that, in contemporary terms, denotes legal membership to an internationally recognized sovereign state. But beyond this simple definition, there are many other layers of meaning that reflect distinct historical experiences and civilizations. The etymology is Greek, and as is well known, the practice and conceptualization emerged from ancient Greek city-states. But, of course, different polities had different rules of membership. Romans did not have a blood-based conception of citizenship, and boundaries were more permeable. For example, in Greece, citizenship was transmitted via both parents, while in Rome, conquered people and slaves could attain that desired status. In contemporary terms, we might define these differences as civic and ethnic, or jus jus soli and sanguinis.  Citizenship regimes also greatly differ in terms of the conferred rights and responsibilities. Often it meant the right to vote for representatives or for laws, or the obligation to serve in the army. In Rome, only some citizens could run for office, for any number of reasons (gender, lineage, social class, etc). 

 

At its peak, there were 1 million inhabitants of Rome, and tens of millions across the empire, and this would have required a rather large and complex legal and administrative infrastructure to identify and categorize the different classes of citizens. How, one wonders, was this possible in an era that did not have paper or databases? How could officials determine whether a random person they encountered was a citizen? 

 

Rubicon helps to provide answers to these questions. In the text, we learn for example, about the Villa Publica, where every 5 years Roman men were obligated to present themselves and declare all their possessions, including slaves, and the names and details of their wives and children. Modern notions of privacy did not exist; the “public” in republic was taken quite literally, and hence the state had the right to document and practice surveillance on the most intimate details of citizens’ lives. This information, accumulated over centuries, was written on papyrus using ink pens, none of which survive because of their fragility. Most likely, they burned in one of the fires that periodically inflamed the city, or they just decayed and were thrown out. At the time, however, these piles of documents were an essential part of the republic’s nervous system and were used to make major policy decisions on war, taxation, or public investment. After reading Rubicon, I could develop an image of this complex in Villa Publica, with many rooms where bureaucrats would be sitting down documenting information, and perhaps large storage rooms with shelves or cabinets which contained the piles of documents, perhaps divided into different sections: year, location of citizens (i.e., Rome, provinces, etc). When citizenship was extended beyond the confines of Italy, it would have been impossible for the vast majority to travel to Rome for this purpose, and so most likely, the information was gathered by governors of the provinces, who then had it transported back to the capital for record-keeping.

 

Another core institution of Rome was slavery. This institution, of course, was not unique to Rome, but like citizenship, it had different features in different civilizations and epochs. The image that most contemporary readers have derives from the race-based slavery of the modern period, when Africans were transported to the Americas. In ancient China, slavery was a legally recognized and practiced social institution, but unlike modern slavery, it was not predicated on irreducible racial differences, as many slaves came from the dominant Han ethnic group, while others were from surrounding regions and hence Asian, that is, not significantly different. Ancient Greece also had slaves, and here too, many were either Greek in origin or from polities not too far away, and consequently, ethnically similar. Rome displays the same pattern of non-race-based slavery, in part because they did not have modern notions of race in their imaginary or vocabulary, even though they observed and described physical differences between, for example, Germans, Romans, and Africans. But there were some peculiarities in the institution that were distinctly Roman. One was the relative ease and frequency with which slaves could become freemen and citizens, as their masters could purchase their freedom, or they could gain it via rewards for excellent service, or their master’s will. Foreigners who travelled to Rome were often taken aback by this relative ease with which slaves could become citizens. This more fluid and permeable categorization meant that social mobility was much higher in Rome than elsewhere, and many prominent Romans actually had slave ancestry.

 

Another feature was the ethnic diversity of slaves, which reflected the vastness of the empire; Greeks, British, Gauls, Syrians, Germans, and other defeated peoples often entered slave markets. In Rubicon, the reader discovers the ethnic stereotypes about different slaves; the Gauls were the best herders, the British were best at manual labour, and the Greeks did the intellectual work. Readers of Rubicon will be surprised to learn that some slaves of wealthy Romans were actually medical doctors. It was Greek slaves who had the skills to perform this task, and the same was true for other intellectual work, such as editing or accounting. Readers will also be surprised to discover that some of the poorest Roman citizens had slaves, even though the wealthy possessed them in larger numbers. There is no evidence that this state of affairs was ever questioned; there were slave revolts, like the famous revolt of Spartacus and 130 thousand slaves in 73 BC for their abominable treatment, but they were demanding the rights of their masters, not the end of slavery as an institution. For various reasons too complex to address in this blogpost, it was only in 18th-century England that there emerged a movement to end the practice, which gradually led to its universal prohibition.

 

Civil Wars

 

The period covered in Rubicon is mainly the second and first centuries BC, when the empire was vast in terms of territorial and wealth accumulation, which led to class conflicts over the distribution of the spoils. These would eventually generate civil conflicts, which would culminate in the end of the republic, but the process would take over a century and a half to materialize. 

 

Throughout Rome’s history, beneath the surface of republican institutions, class conflicts were always simmering and threatening to explode, but a lid was kept on them because the elite was willing to gradually expand the rights of the plebs. And it is perhaps no coincidence that Rome’s greatest expansions occurred as the plebs’ rights increased, since their enfranchisement led to the democratization of the demand for glory, a core feature of Roman identity. This demand for glory could be satisfied in the Colosseum’s gladiatorial fights, in the Senate or courts, and through military conquest, which perhaps also allowed some of the pressures from the class conflicts to be externalized to other pursuits. But by the middle of the second century BC, it seemed as if these conflicts and the underlying inequalities that generated them had become incorrigibly acute, as evidenced by the economic transformation; whereas previously Roman citizens owned and tended their own farms, as inequality rose, the wealthy purchased large tracts of land and purchased large numbers of slaves to work on them. Plebs and other lower-class citizens were displaced, and many became homeless. They could voice their grievances via the plebian assemblies, which represented their interests, and populists emerged to satisfy their demands for fairness.

 

The Gracchus brothers represent the first wave of this populist backlash against Rome’s corrupt elite, which reached the highest echelons of the state and set in motion the train of events that would lead to the clashes that ended the Republic. Gaius Gracchus’s demands were mainly for the Senate to redistribute land to the plebs; this would have involved confiscating land from wealthy land owners, many of whom were either Senators themselves or had client-patron relations with them, and so the Senate’s veto was assured. Gaius persisted and even was willing to engage in extra- or anti-constitutional measures to enact his agenda. For this, he was killed by a mob of senators and their supporters, but this did not put an end to the underlying class conflict. His brother, Tiberius, was an even more radical populist reformer, and not only demanded the redistribution of land, but also measures to end corruption, and the provision of grain and maize to those in need. He, too, was unceremoniously taken out by those acting on behalf of the interests of the Senate (and, therefore, the beneficiaries of existing arrangements). 

 

The Senate was mistaken if it believed that eliminating the Gracchus brothers would restore the pre-populist status quo; the underlying class conflict would subsequently manifest in the civil wars between the Marius and Sulla factions. Sulla would ultimately prevail and would neutralize the plebeian assembly by removing their veto power.

 

Julius Caesar would turn out to be the most glamorous and consequential populist leader to enter the scene, and his qualities as a scholar, soldier, politician, lover, and adventurer have dazzled generations of historians and thinkers ever since. For these reasons, the pages of Rubicon, including the title, devote much attention to his exploits and legacy. He was born into a noble family, the Julio-Claudian dynasty, who believed they were descended from the Trojan hero Aeneus, and from Venus, the god of love. From an early age, he held a number of important political offices, including the “aedile”, which, to my knowledge, has no modern equivalent and was responsible for the management of the games and public spaces. He also held the prestigious and powerful office of pontifex maximus, or chief priest, who was the intermediary between the people and the gods. Caesar was also governor of Spain, a periodically rebellious province which he successfully subdued. The conquest of Gaul, or modern-day France, was one of Caesar’s most documented adventures in part because of how bloody they were, in part because Gaul was Rome’s ancient foe and its absorption into the Roman empire would not only permanently eliminate the threat, it would also create the civilization of France. The Gauls’ resistance, led by the famous Vercingetorix, was fierce. Caesar himself participated in the battles, and his courage, fighting ability, strategizing, plus his willingness to share in the hardships of his men led to soldiers’ unwavering love and loyalty to their leader. 

 

At the time, executive power over Rome's affairs was being shared with Pompey, and disputes arose between the Senate and Caesar over the legality of the Gallic wars. A message was sent to Caesar ordering him to disband his army and return to Rome, a decision with which he strongly disagreed, and this was when the moment of truth arrived. Disobedience would mean a resumption of the civil conflict that had destabilized Rome during the clashes between the Gracchus brothers and the Senate, and between Marius and Sulla. When the decision was made, Caesar uttered the phrase—the die has been cast—which would reverberate through the ages, and the moment he crossed the Rubicon, he not only would permanently change history, but he also gave posterity a new vocabulary to describe momentous decisions from which there was no possibility of turning back.

 

Pompey was Caesar’s existential foe in this battle, and on the surface, their disputes were over the exercise of political power. But as Rubicon helpfully reminds readers, there was also the underlying class conflict mentioned above; while the Senate and its wealthy patrons supported Pompey, the plebeian and lower-class faction supported Caesar. There were both economic and cultural reasons for this. Caesar’s policies entailed substantial redistribution of resources towards the lower class. And in a classic populist fashion, he was also very charismatic, spoke with a lower-class accent, and had a very frugal lifestyle despite all the comforts and riches that his position afforded him.

 

When he entered Rome with his soldiers—an illegal and unconstitutional act—he discovered that many of his enemies, including Pompey, had fled. And so the fighting between the factions would occur far from the capital. Pompey was ultimately captured and beheaded; now, Caesar had no serious rivals, and as is well known, he abused his power. When the Senate voted to make Caesar dictator for life, his fate was sealed, and on the fateful Ides of March, he was killed by a group, right beside a statue of Pompey, who had wanted to restore the Republic. The plebs who provided the backbone of Caesar’s support were outraged and rioted, destroying the homes of the attackers and several government buildings.

 

Caesar’s chosen successor was his nephew Octavius, who shared power with Mark Antony and Lepidus. To restore order, the three held executive power without reference to the Senate. This martial law, they believed, would be temporary, and constitutional rule would return after stability was restored. As it turns out, Mark Antony and Octavius had a falling out when the former went to Egypt, began a love affair with Cleopatra, who not only seduced him physically, but he also developed an affinity for Eastern ideas of universal and divine monarchy. The disputes between Octavius and Mark Antony could not be resolved peacefully, and the latter was ultimately defeated in the battle of Actium. 

 

Now, Octavius became the unrivalled emperor and was given the name, Augustus, the Holy One, through which he is known by posterity. For many historians, this was the definitive end of the republic and the beginning of the imperial period. But a little probing reveals that this reflects an attempt to neatly divide historical periods rather than an actual reflection of a messy reality. For one, Rome was an empire well before Augustus assumed power. Meanwhile, republican institutions arguably stopped operating effectively during the clash between the Gracchus and the senate 150 years prior. The meaning of “republic” is a polity where citizens are equal and are represented irrespective of class or other categories, and yet as inequality increased, the Senate became more and more corrupt, while the plebian assemblies could no longer effectively represent the interests of the lower class majority; under these conditions, it would be stretch to call this “republic” or “democracy” even if they continued to be enshrined in formal constitutional rules.

 

The picture is further muddied by the fact that the available evidence suggests Augustus was very popular and supported by the majority of plebs. The reason is that he ended the civil wars, and by restoring peace, established the conditions for a new golden age. Moreover, much of this wealth was distributed to the plebs in the form of pensions, or land, or free food. Thus, a strong case can be made that he enjoyed popular legitimacy because of the outcomes—peace and prosperity, without which liberty is not possible—of his successful governance. In the contemporary political science literature, this has a technical term—output legitimacy—and is extensively documented as a viable alternative to input legitimacy, namely, the consent which derives from elections. A related question is whether, in the absence of elections, there was any process to hold Augustus accountable in the event of failure. A short answer is yes, because Roman citizens could and did participate in riots or violent protests, while Roman emperors could and would be killed for their failures. From these reflections, I conclude that Augustus does not fall neatly into any familiar categories, such as dictator or autocrat; he was the emperor, resembled a monarch, but evidently supported by the majority, and this popular mandate depended on his keeping the end of the bargain, namely, governing in a way that ensured the people’s desire for peace, prosperity, and liberty was satisfied. 

A Review of Tom Holland's "Pax: War and Peace in Rome’s Golden Age"

This blogpost is the first in a series on the works of Tom Holland, a popular writer on ancient Roman history. He is a professional historian, but one of his many talents is to make the study of Roman history compelling and engaging for non-specialists via prose written in an accessible style. In his works, he does not merely compile the facts, dates, and significance of the events; rather, he weaves them together to form a narrative that helps the reader experience what it was like to live during the period. On its own, this is a noteworthy accomplishment, but his works have other benefits for readers, like me, who have an enduring fascination with ancient Rome. One is to learn in great detail about the personal lives of second-century AD emperors, such as Trajan and Hadrian, who left an enduring legacy in the history of the empire. Another is to obtain a bird’s eye view of the empire, which during this period stretched from Britain to Arabia, and because of a single administrative system covering such a vast and diverse territory, had created an unprecedented level of exchange of goods, services, people, and ideas. As such, it would only be a little bit of a stretch to characterize this period as the first wave of globalization (at the time, goods from Asia reached Rome; only the Americas were not connected to the Eurasian landmass). 

 

In this blogpost, I will present Tom Holland’s Pax: War and Peace in Rome’s Golden Age with an emphasis on several themes, including the deepening and intertwined relationship with Greece, which would eventually determine the cultural composition of the empire, and the successful conquest and pacification of key regions on the opposite ends of the empire, Judea and Britain, which would delineate the empire’s boundaries and which contributed to a proto form of globalization destined to dramatically alter the course of Western history. Lastly, we will explore some of the great emperors who contributed to these events, such as Titus, Vespasian, Trajan, and Hadrian. 

 

Unruly peoples in the periphery

 

Greece was conquered in 146 BC, well before the period covered in the text under discussion, and by the first and second centuries AD had become a shadow of its former self. The city’s glory was during the golden age of the 4th and 5th centuries BC, during which, as is generally known, it produced proto forms of democracy, rationalism, and philosophy. This golden age was snuffed out by Athens and Sparta’s—and their respective allies’—mutual destruction during the Peloponnesian War in 431 BC. Despite the war’s official ending, quarrels continued between various Greek city-states, and it was the Roman conquest, we learn in Pax, which finally put an end to them and established a semblance of stability and peace. Moreover, it integrated the Greek world into the Roman empire, and as is well known Greek language, culture, religion, literature, and architecture had an enduring influence. During the second century BC, for example, many Roman elites were educated in Athens and became “hellenized”; this distanced them from their local compatriots, who were more conservative in the sense of being attached to Roman traditions. At the same time, in echoes of the relationship today between America and its European satellites, while Romans admired the beauty and culture of Greece, Greeks viewed their Roman overlords as philistines. 

            

During the period under discussion in Pax, Greece continued to be frequently visited by elite Romans for education and tourism. Many Greeks also lived in Rome, often as slaves, although not doing menial tasks or hard labour. Rather, they worked for many nobles as personal doctors, secretaries, editors, and other fields that required intellectual effort. They had an enduring reputation for being educated, clever, and witty, but also effeminate and hedonistic. It was partly for this reason that many Romans warned against their influence, believing that it threatened to undermine the manly and martial values which made their empire redoubtable. 


Thus, Romans were ambivalent in their views of Greeks, but for some, they continued to merit respect and admiration. One of the emperors discussed in Pax, Hadrian, had a deep fondness for Greece, and one reason was that Antonius, a beautiful young Greek boy of 19 or 20, was his lover and offered Hadrian, says Holland, “a distinctly Greek kind of love, which blurred the erotic with the poetic”. In his travels to various Greek cities accompanied—strangely to contemporary sensibilities—by both his wife and his young male lover—Hadrian committed to re-establishing their glory, via massive investment in public works and refurbishment of crumbling buildings. His vision included the establishment of a pan-Hellenic union which would unite Greek cities under a single administration and Roman tutelage. The Roman Senate gave its approval, highlighting the special place that Greece had in the Roman Empire. So special, in fact, that when the city of Rome was sacked, and the Western part eventually collapsed, the empire became divided into Latin and Greek parts, and it was the latter which would survive, in the form of the Byzantine empire, until 1452. 


Britain was conquered and pacified much later than Greece. In 43 AD, Vespasian successfully defeated locals in the Battle of Medway, and the Southern part of Britain became a Roman province. At the time, the island was divided into many different tribes, all, believed the Romans, in various states of barbarism as they did not have the refinements of Roman or Greek life, including literature, art, or architecture. One particular British tribe, the Caledonians, we learn in Pax, was among the most barbarous, as they practiced human sacrifice, and they had not yet been subdued. Agricola, in the major battle of Goaupius, finally defeated and subjugated them. And as with other Roman provinces, Britain gradually became Romanized and adopted all the advanced accoutrements of Roman civilization. The entire Island was not yet conquered, however, and Hadrian, in his travels to Britain, participated in further campaigns against locals, which were often costly and inconclusive. After these experiences, he decided that it would not be worthwhile to conquer the northernmost parts of Britain, and ordered the building of the famous Hadrian’s wall—which still is visible—to demarcate the northernmost borders of the Roman empire. This line, which separated Romanized regions and peoples from others, would eventually lead to two distinct nations, English and Scottish. 


A large part of Pax is devoted to recounting the gory details of the conquest and destruction of Jews’ homeland, Jerusalem, in AD 71. It was Pompey the Great who initially conquered the capital 100 years prior, and subsequently, relations had been cordial, in part because Judean leaders had accepted Roman rule and paid their taxes. In some cases, they even integrated Roman civilization into their capital city. Herod the Great, who famously rebuilt the temple after its destruction by the Babylonians, had also built temples to honour Augustus, plus Roman-style theatres and monuments to impress visitors from the capital. Because of these cordial relations, it was relatively cheap to govern them, and Romans only had a small contingent to ensure order and authority.


Relations deteriorated in 66 AD, and the famous revolt against Roman rule commenced the same year. Vespasian made the order to send 3 legions, a total of 60 thousand men, and Titus arrived at the Jerusalem gates in AD 70. They preferred that the Judeans surrender, as he knew that there were internal divisions and that some accepted Roman authority. But the rebel faction evidently had the upper hand, and Titus made the decision to siege the city and starve it into submission. As supplies dwindled, food had to be rationed to fighters, and many Judeans starved to death. In some of the macabre scenes in the book, their bodies, with bulging bellies typical of starvation, were thrown over the wall towards the Romans. Some rebels in desperation took the risk of sneaking out to obtain supplies of food, but they were caught by the Romans and crucified in front of Jerusalem’s walls to send a message to those remaining inside that there would be no mercy unless they surrendered. After three months, the final assault was ordered, and the gates and walls of the Holy City were penetrated; Judeans fled into their holiest place, the temple, believing that their god would save them, but it was not to be. The Romans mercilessly slaughtered them and rased their sacred temple to the ground.


The significance of this can hardly be understated. Now, the Judeans’ holy land was a Roman province, which they would give the name that remains to this day, Palestina. It set a precedent and an example to other peoples around the empire, namely, that rebellion will lead to utter destruction. The wealth of Jerusalem was taken and paraded through the streets of Rome, and this was memorialized in the famous arch of Titus, which tourists can still visit and see up close, and in coins with the inscription “Judea Conquered.”Jews were now dispersed around the world, and many fled to Rome, where they lived among, and easily blended in with, ordinary Romans, made possible because they were Mediterranean peoples who resembled Italians and Greeks (unlike, say, the lighter-skinned and haired Germans and Britons, or the darker-skinned Ethiopians). Many became slaves, others citizens, and over time, some would assimilate entirely among Roman peoples and lose all vestiges of their ancestors’ faith. 


Hadrian, after his travels to Greece mentioned above, travelled to Jerusalem. Six decades had passed since the revolt and the city’s destruction, and the temple still lay in ruins. Some local Jews remained in the city and dreamed of rebuilding the temple. Hadrian had considered restoring Jerusalem just as he had done in Greece, but his vision clashed with the locals. Rather than rebuilding Judeans’ former monuments, he wanted to Romanize the city even more, and to add insult to injury, built a temple to honour Jupiter, the greatest of Roman gods. According to Holland, he believed the Judeans did not deserve his benevolence, as they were inveterately rebellious. 


Lastly, readers of Pax will learn some fascinating details about a civilization the Romans attempted, but failed, to conquer, namely the Persians. Both Romans and Greeks looked down on them as slavish and effeminate; approaching their king, they’d kneel like slaves, while they wore eyeliner and ringlets in their hair. Unlike the Britons and the Judeans, Persians were comparable to Rome in size and military strength, and many Romans dreamed of the glory of Alexander in their campaigns to conquer Parthia, which ultimately ended in failure. In 36 BC, Mark Anthony’s attempt ended in utter failure, and 30 thousand men were lost. Augustus recognized Rome’s limits and signed a peace treaty with them, but one of his successors, Trajan, took up the mantle for the glory of Rome, and initially scored some decisive victories, capturing the symbolically important Babylonia, the city where Alexander died. Next on the list was Mesopotopia, but the gods had other plans; some Jews who were scattered after the destruction of their temple went to live in Persian lands, and they joined the fight against the Roman invaders. Shortly after this failure, Trajan died from the exhaustion of these military campaigns. He was replaced by Hadrian, who concluded, correctly, that the empire was overstretched and ordered the withdrawal from Persian territories. 


At this point, the borders of the Roman empire reached their peak, and it was Hadrian who played a major role in establishing them from the Northernmost to the Southernmost reaches. This period is also associated with the golden age, in part because of the increase in trade which the empire’s connectivity across vast distances had produced. Shared languages among elites (Latin or Greek), a single currency that could be used for payments everywhere (denari), and a single system of law and transportation vastly expanded commercial opportunities, and many profited enormously. By 100 AD, the city of Rome’s population was 1 million, an unprecedented size in the ancient world. Most lived in precarious 4 or 5-story apartment blocks, while the wealthy lived in villas. The Bay of Naples became an ancient version of Dubai, a place where the wealthy purchased properties, lived in luxury, and practised debauchery. Here, we learn in Pax, money became the measure of everything, as the nouveau riche consumed luxuries from across the empire and beyond, including silks from China. These same elites were often educated in Greece, had Greek slaves, and were mesmerized by exotic ideas and philosophies produced by Greek intellectuals. Some Greek practices adopted by these Romans, such as cooking exotic recipes with ingredients from afar—a major departure from the Romans' traditionally manly and simple diet of locally grown food—were probably not that significant. But others, such as becoming more intellectual and hedonistic and less warrior-like, would probably have greater repercussions, especially for the nobility, as their sons were less and less willing, as their ancestors had done, to sacrifice themselves for the glory of Rome.


One Eastern influence, but this one from Jerusalem, Christianity, was destined, however, to forever change the fabric of the empire and history. It was Rome’s connectivity that facilitated the diffusion of all ideas, including those of Jesus, and consequently, many quickly converted. Rome was a multireligious empire, and Roman authorities did not interfere in locals’ religious practices. But in Pax, we learn about how many 1st-century Romans viewed this Jewish heresy with deep suspicion. For example, Tacitus was appointed by Trajan to govern Asia, and believed that the East’s influence posed a threat to Rome’s moral fabric. In a letter to the emperor, he said this sect, which called itself “Christian”, was particularly egregious, anti-social, and anti-Roman authority. Pliny, also a governor and an intellectual, noticed that this belief was spreading very fast and threatened Rome’s order. He accused them of, among other things, “depravity” and “stubbornness”.  He tried to nip it in the bud by prosecuting adherents. They were arrested, and commanded by Pliny to worship Caesar—by then believed to be a god—and Jupiter. Christians refused and were executed in cold blood, but this did not produce the desired results, as the faith spread quickly, first in the Eastern provinces, then eventually in Rome. The rest, as we know, is history, as the entire empire would eventually convert to this faith, which would utterly transform Roman civilization and set the foundation for what came next, namely, Europe.

Wednesday, September 3, 2025

On the History of Human Rights

In 2021, during the height of the pandemic, a friend published an excellent novel, and in one of the closing scenes, there is a dialogue between the main character and a professor he meets in a café in Athens. During their conversation, some of the fundamental concepts in the Western political lexicon, such as democracy and human rights, are interrogated. The dialogue highlighted how these concepts are eminently debatable and theoretically contested, which was very thought provoking because I, like most Westerners, took these concepts for granted, and just assumed that they were out there and part of nature, like the weather or the cosmos. I asked my friend where he obtained the material for this scene, and he replied from the works of French philosopher Alain de Benoist, and two in particular: Au-delà des droits de l'homme, and Démocratie: le problème. Intrigued, I decided to read them during the summer of 2025 (in their original French versions) and, similar to the scene in the mentioned novel, his ideas forced me to think in new ways about these largely unquestioned concepts in the Western political vocabulary.

 

De Benoist’s main argument in the first book is that the idea of human rights, as they are understood in the West, does not have a sound theoretical foundation.  Human rights are understood as universal, independent of culture, history, or civilization, and as a birthright of all individuals. This belief is part of the general education system, enshrined in many legal documents (not the least, the UN Charter), and motivates many political parties’ and activists’ activities. In the mentioned texts we learn—or perhaps reminded is a better term—that the seeds of this idea emerged in a specific religious (Christian) and cultural (Western) context which is not universal. Other cultures and civilizations, for example, especially in the East, emphasized duty and responsibility to the collective rather than the idea of “rights” in opposition to society and/or state.  On the question of democracy, de Benoist also employs historical analysis to show that the inventors of this regime—the ancient Greeks—had a very different understanding and practice than we moderns: similar to Eastern civilizations’ understanding, it was rooted in obligations towards, and participation in, the community, not in the idea of individual rights assumed to be distinct and/or separate from group (nation, culture, ethnicity, etc) membership.

 

Both texts were published two generations ago, and yet they have contemporary relevance, given the crisis of democracy that the West is currently experiencing. This crisis has many explanations, and the books under review may provide another one, namely, that the liberal focus on individual rights, both economic and cultural, in some cases has clashed with the collective interests of the community, generating various grievances. The populist backlash, animated by the demand for the restoration of the “people’s” sovereignty, attests to the sense felt by many that their political regimes are unrepresentative of the collective as they define it.

 

History of Human Rights

 

Ancient Greece and Rome did not have a conception of universal human rights. They had the concept of citizenship, but the practices that today we would call “rights”, for example, to property, or to vote, were strictly related to membership to a community, and were predicated on the obligations towards, and contributions to, said community. A major anthropological rupture occurred with the arrival of Christianity on the historical scene, which presupposed the existence of a relationship with God that was independent of the relationship to the group. Moreover, Christians introduced the revolutionary idea that human beings—all human beings—were created in God’s image, and possessed a soul which conferred a property called “dignity,” simply by virtue of being born as a member of humanity. Here, in fact, we have the seeds of modern human rights: the idea of universality, and the mystical notion  there exists a substance called a soul which gives the individual instrinsic value independent of the collectivity.  

 

It would take many centuries before this idea would take its contemporary secular form. The French and the American revolutions, in particular, were major turning points, although the latter more directly maintained the religious associations (“all endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights…”). It is generally understood that the French revolution was more secular, but Alain de Benoist shows that below the surface of the anti-religious rhetoric, the supernatural foundations were maintained, perhaps because it could not have been otherwise. Contrary to widely held views, the idea of human rights finds little justification in nature alone. Nature, in fact, is radically unequal, and provides little grounds for the ontological assumptions of human rights (freedom, universal reason, dignity, individualism, justice, etc).

 

The idea of universality, whether in religious or secular form, contains within it an intolerance of contrary ideas, and this tendency to not recognize the validity of alternative views makes wars more bloody. For example, the French revolution—which, it bears repeating, was an attempt to secularize religious ideas—was followed by the great terror and the revolutionary wars across Europe which led to far more deaths than the Crusades many centuries prior. One reason is that the revolutionaries were now fighting for “liberty”, and so ipso facto opponents did not have legitimate claims to authority.

 

Further evidence of its religious origin is that the idea of human rights has for many Westerners obtained a sacred character. To question them is similar to how it was to question God in pre-modern times, despite the fact that concept is constantly evolving; some human rights today would have been unthinkable only 20 or 30 years ago. One reason for the continuously changing panoply of human rights is that their radical individualist and anti-collectivist nature provides little grounds for placing limits on claims to them. Consequently, it contains the seeds of an inflation of rights, as individual desires more and more become the basis of rights claims.  

 

As individual rights expand, unrepresentative institutions such as the courts settle disputes related to them; consequently, they arrogate to themselves more power to create laws which override public opinion or the legislatures that, in theory, express the views of the majority. The tension between the individual and the collective can become acute such that majorities in some societies have the perception—and in politics perception matters more than reality—that things have gone awry.

 

In contemporary politics, different political groups appropriate the language of human rights to further their ideology. Free-market liberals, for example, claim that individuals have rights to property, meaning to purchase, sell, invest, or trade with whomever they please, domestically or internationally. Actors on the contemporary left, meanwhile, apply this reasoning to cultural or identity domains—for example, the rights of individuals to migrate, or to affirm their sexual identity. Although both would claim to be defending the interests of groups (property owners in the first, minorities in the second), they are both, in fact, denying the right of the larger group—family, tribe, nation, religion, state, etc—to place limits in individuals’ claims.

 

Communities may have valid reasons for limiting the right, say, to property or migration, and yet in Western discourse, certainly among an element of the intelligentsia, this is rarely recognized.  Many people, especially those outside of major cosmopolitan cities, may object to the changes in their countries or communities which may accrue as a result of the trade and migration perhaps because of an attachment to culture or tradition. This is one of the grievances which fuels populism, which is in some ways a reassertion of the claim that collective interests should override individual rights. For instance, protectionism in the form of tariffs is essentially saying: individuals do not have the right to trade with foreigners.  Placing limits on migration, meanwhile, conveys the message that individuals do not have the right to freely cross borders. In both cases, limits on the individual are justified on the basis of some collective, or the wish to protect an aspect of society. From this perspective, it is sometimes amusing to observe parties on the left and right insulting each other on matters of policy, when the real dispute is on which individual rights—economic or cultural—to privilege. (It also highlights that the much aligned libertarians—a tiny minority of liberals—are the only ones who are actually coherent as they defend individual rights—economic and cultural—across the board).

 

Many contemporary commentators call populists “authoritarian” because they defend positions that violate individual rights, either economic or cultural. But this conflates liberalism and democracy, which is another tendency of contemporary Western discourse. The texts under review helpfully remind readers that the two are distinct and in many ways in tension. The etymological origin of the Greek“cracy” in democracy points to its meaning as a form of political rule, while liberalism, historically and etymologically, is an ideology about limiting government power over individuals. Thus, it is entirely logically possible to be illiberal and democratic, or conversely, anti-democratic and liberal. Indeed, it is this divide, rather than the left-right axis, which may better account for many contemporary political conflicts: populists, for example, fall squarely in the former, while many cosmopolitan elites in large cities are more likely to emphasise individual rights—to property or to migrate—whether or not the majority agrees.

 

The contested nature of the concept of democracy is also revealed when we consider that liberals and socialists have very different ideas of its meaning. Liberals adopt a rules-based definition: secure property rights, elections where many parties compete for power, and courts to adjudicate disputes. Socialists, meanwhile, look at underlying societal inequalities, arguing that democracy is more related to substantive societal outcomes.

 

The texts under review are mostly a critique of the first not the second conception; Alain de Benoist accepts the socialist critique of liberal forms of democracy but goes further by highlighting some more important conditions which are arguably sine qua non. One is group membership, which provides cohesion, a sense of shared destiny, and social trust, and it is these which ultimately provide the legitimacy of different political regimes, whether monarchical or democratic. It follows that democratic regimes without these traits can lack legitimacy, which is another way of saying consent, the opposite of which is coercion. A unified sense of group membership also allows political and social conflicts to occur peacefully, because conflicts are subsumed to higher principles to which all are committed or adhere to. For democracy to function properly, this sense of shared destiny should also motivate participation, or active citizenship, which was central to the Greek conception and which de Benoist argues provides a standard against which we can compare contemporary political systems.  On these indicators, many Western countries fall short, with some showing that around half of citizens do not vote. Polarisation is endemic and indicates very low social trust. Much public opinion data which shows how majorities in the US and Europe do not believe that they can influence political outcomes.  And citizens have many valid reasons for this perception, such as the role of wealth and lobbying in determining policy, or the general sense that leaders are not accountable for their decisions. 

 

 

What is to be done, then, to address the crisis of Western democracy? De Benoist argues that referendums are a useful mechanism, as they help to accomplish several objectives. One is to override the will of the elite or the political class. There are moments in history when a political class and elite do not reflect the wishes of the majority and certainly not the preferences of those on the lower end of the social hierarchy. Another is to give citizens of all social classes, but especially those on the lower end, the possibility to decide on the laws and direction of their country.

 

Thus it is not surprising that populists around the world often demand referendums on major questions domestic or international. In a very important sense, they are demanding a return to Greek forms of democracy, in which there is widespread participation, and where ordinary citizens—who form the majority—and not the elite make decisions on policy. The wish for a referendum, whatever the public justification, reflects the widely felt sense that the other institutions of the policy—parliaments, regulatory agencies, schools, courts, etc—are making decisions not representative of what the majority wants, or that the political class is deeply corrupt and not trustworthy. The lesson from the Greeks is that allowing more referendums would enhance democratic participation even if majorites voted for policies that violated individual rights